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The Liquisa massacre 
On 12 January, Indonesian troops murdered six villagers in the village of Gariana, Liquisa district, 
claiming that they were guerrillas. A statement from the CNRM, the East Timor council of resis-
tance that the victims were civilians who had been shot dead in cold blood was later confirmed by 
the BBC World Service. The massacre was widely condemned, forcing Jakarta to investigate the af-
fair. 
Liquisa is a small town on the north coast of East Timor, 
some thirty miles west of Dili. It has never before figured in 
reports about guerrilla activities so army claims that guerril-
las were active in the area came as something of a surprise. 
The six victims of the massacre were Jose Nunes, kam-
pung head, Abel Nunes, a relative, Agosto Pinto Nunes, 
Victoria, the son of Agusto, Americo Araujo and Osario 
Soares. The day before they were captured on 11 January, 
there was an encounter between soldiers and guerrillas during 
which a soldier was injured; all the guerrillas got away with 
weapons seized from the army. Hoping to avenge their 
botched operation, the troops entered the village of Gariana 
the next day, to hunt down the guerrillas. They captured the 
New press clampdown 
Journalists arrested 
U1ithin a single week in March, security offi-
cers raided the offices of three organisations 
and arrested a number of people. On 10 
March the offices of Pf JAR and ALDERA 
were raided; a week later it was All's turn. 
Already for several weeks rumours circulated that !he 
authorities would take stern action against several publica-
tions, in particular those published without the obligatory 
SIUPP printing licence. During the 10 March raid on PJJAR 
and the arrest of Tri Agus Siswomihardjo, editor of its pub-
lication, Kabar Dari Pijar (News from PIJAR), it became 
clear that the press clampdown of June 1994 when three ma-
jor weeklies were closed down was far from over. A week 
later, five members of AJJ, the Alliance of Independent Jour-
nalists, were arrested: Ahmad Taufik, Eko Maryadi, 
Danang, J. Sabir and Abdul Haris. Both PJJAR, an out-
spoken NGO based in Jakarta and AJ/, set up in the wake of 
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kampung head, Jose Nunes and three others and forced them, 
with their hands tied, to lead them to where the guerrillas 
were thought to be hiding. An alleged guerrilla named An-
tonio was found hiding in a hut with two others. Antonio fled 
to the hills with soldiers on his heels but he escaped. The 
troops returned, rounded up the two men who had been found 
in the hut. They and the other four were then dragged to the 
river Magatai and shot dead. [Forum Keadilan, 16.III .1995] 
Army revenge 
A Reuter report from Jakarta on 14 March confirms that a 
day before the killing of the six a major gun-battle took place 
between the Timorese armed resistance and Indonesian 
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EAST TIMOR 
troops. T imorese sources told Reuter that the 11 January 
clash was one of the biggest in years in the territory confirm-
ing that guerrilla activities arc far from over. It involved 60 
guerri llas including the leader Konis Santana. In this clash 
one Timorese was killed while the Indonesian troops suffered 
two casualties. ... . That made them angry, which is why they 
killed the six civilians", the source said 
Since 1992 Indonesian troops have captured three of the 
main resistance leaders, including Xanana Gusmao. 
When it emerged in early February that diplomats in Ja-
karta. from the Australian, Canadian, US and Dutch embas-
sies were seeking clarifications about the killings, it was clear 
that Suharto would have to act before international protests 
snowballed ?ut of control. International concern was in any 
case spreading because of the alarming reports from Dili 
about hooded gangs who were terrorising the community. 
[See separate item.] 
The army's version 
The army was quick to present its own version of whaf 
had happened. Having said initially that ' six guerri11as' had 
been killed, the story changed. They . now said, two were 
~errillas an~ the other four were civilians who were support-
ing the guemllas and therefore legitimate targets. 
When interest persisted, the local military commander 
elaborated on the operation, claiming that the local district 
chief had reported the presence of guerrillas in the area. The -
army then sent out a unit to hunt down a group of 45 guerril-
las. They captured the kampung chief and three others found 
in his house all of whom had allegedly been in regular con-
tact with the guerrillas . These four captives were then ordered 
to help the soldiers hunt down a guerrilla named Antonio da 
Silva. After a day's fruitless search, they came to a hut where 
Antonio and two others were allegedly hiding. The troops 
opened fire . Antonio escaped and the others were shot dead 
in the hut. As this was going on, the four captives ran off 
whereupon another group of soldiers opened fire , killing 
them all. 
With interest in the incident growing, armed forces com-
mandcr-in-chief General Feisal Tanjung reported the results 
of initial investigations to President Suharto . Thi s led State 
Secretary Moerdiono to announce that army procedures had 
been violated and courts martial might follow . Two army 
investigations were then initiated, one under the command of 
the Inspector-General of the armed forces which confirmed 
that violations had occurred. but it was left to an Honorary 
Council of Officers (DKP) to identify the mistakes and the 
punishment. As we went to press, the findings of the Council 
had not been announced. 
All the while, the officers in charge of operations in East 
Timor, Colonel Kiki Syahnakri in Dili and his superior in 
Bali, Major-General Adang Ruhiatna, Udayana regional 
commander, were insisting that the troops had acted cor-
rectly, vigorously denying that innocent civilians had been 
killed. Justification for the massacre also came from General 
Feisal Tanjung who claimed that the guerrillas had been , 
hoping to establish a base in Liquisa, near Dili, from where 
they could draw world attention to their presence. 
Enter the KOMNAS HAM 
Meanwhile, the National Commission for Human Rights 
decided to initiate investigations, its first venture into East 
Timor affairs since its establishment two years ago. The in-
vestigation team was headed by its chair, Ali Said, former 
Chief Justice, with its only East Timorese member, 
Clementina dos Reis Amaral, taking part. Since the team 
pressed ahead with plans to meet and question villagers and 
eyewitnesses, it was bound to come up with a version differ-
ent from the army's. 
A brief summary of its findings was made public on 1 
March. Although it confirmed that all the victims were civil-
ians, it confused things by saying that "it had not yet been 
possible to ascertain their status". However, the Commission 
insisted that the six men were intimidated and tortured before 
being put to death, that the troops had acted 'recklessly', that 
the shooting was 'in violation of the law' and that relatives 
had been prevented from obtaining information and the bod-
ies had been treated inhumanely. 
The Commission has been criticised by the Legal Aid 
Institute (YLBIIl) for not publishing its findings in full; they 
will only be made available to the government. 'This rein-
forces public doubts about the Commission's objectivity and 
independence," the Institute said in a statement on 9 March. 
It called for a National Investigation Team to be set up, com-
posed of NGOs, members of the press and other persons 
known for their integrity. 
T APOL calls for military to withdraw 
In a statement welcoming the National Commission 's 
initial findings, T APOL said that the armed forces may be 
compelled to replace officers and discipline others as it did 
after the Santa Cruz massacre but this would not lead to any 
improvements. The international community should press for 
the withdrawal of all military forces from occupied East 
Timor as a matter of urgency, it said. * 
Stop press 
. A_ccording to unofficial reports, five army officers will be 
?1srrussed for. t_he killing of six civilians in Liquisa. They 
1~clude the mll1tary commander, Colonel Kiki Syahnakri and 
his deputy, Lt C?lonel Gl~ni Kairupan, the command's 
spokesperson Major L. S1mbolon, the Liquisa district 
commander Lt. Colonel Tri Syarawan, and lst Lt Jeremias 
Kase, who headed the unit in charge of the operation. 
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Situation in Timor goes from bad to worse 
The killings in Liquisa (see front page) are only one incident in a pattern of escalation in human 
rights violations. While Indonesia is increasingly feeling international pressure over human rights 
violations in East Timor, it seems that this is, in some quarters, only creating an escalation of 
abuses. 
Ninja death squads in action 
Death squads known as "ninjas", dressed in black, with 
black masks and armed with knives, have been terrorising the 
population of Dili. A delegation of women went to Bishop 
Belo on 24 January to report that the gangs had been roaming 
through the neighbourhoods throwing stones since early De-
cember ( UCAN, 1 Feb]. On 6 February, Manuel Carrascalao, 
a member of the provincial parliament and member of GOL-
KAR, admitted that, to his knowledge, eight pro-
independence activists had been murdered by these death 
squads since early January. He also said that "about 5,000" 
farmers had stopped tending their fields due to fear of the 
"ninjas", creating the threat of many more deaths through 
famine. [AP, 6 Feb] 
A few days later, a Dili politician referred to the situation 
as "out of control", and sources spoke of at least 30 people 
having "disappeared", houses burned down, and terror 
sweeping Dili [Reuter, 10 Feb]. 
It is well-known in Dili that the "ninjas" are recruited, 
trained and equipped by the army. Dili residents single out 
two men, the notorious Timorese collaborator Labut Melo, 
and another man named Alan, as the primary recruiters and 
leaders of the gangs. They say that "ninjas" who have been 
captured by Dili residents report that they are being highly 
paid by the military. 
In fact, both uniformed troops and paramilitary gangs 
seem to have been involved in a raid on the house of Gilman 
Gusmao, the brother-in-law of Xanana, on 9 February. 
Gusmao' s house and those of his neighbours were de-
stroyed, and six young men were arrested [CNRM press re-
lease, 9 Feb] . Nothing has been heard of these young men 
since the raid. 
People organise themselves 
In response, people in Dili set up their own neighbour-
hood protection squads to defend themselves against the 
"ninjas". It may well have been this development, rather than 
the terror activities of the gangs themselves, which prompted 
the military authorities to deploy troops throughout Dili in 
force on 14 February, allegedly to "protect" the local popula-
tion. In fact, they arrested and charged twelve men who, it 
seems, were pro-independence activists and involved in the 
neighbourhood protection vigilante squads, rather than mem-
bers of the "ninja" gangs at all, as police chief Sugianto 
admitted [Reuter, 21 Feb] . It is also reported that one young 
man, Joaquim Dorego Caetano, was shot dead after two 
truckloads of troops and informers launched a pre-dawn raid 
on 15 February [Reuter, 16 Feb]. 
When asked whether he agreed that the ninjas were or-
ganised by the resistance, Bishop Belo said : "Why on earth 
should Frctilin ninjas appear now? Why not in 1974 or 1976? 
According to me, the ones entitled to say what the ninjas arc 
are the people here. They are the ones who know what's go-
ing on." (Tiras, 2.111.1995] 
The ninja campaign has also terrified local, mainly Chi-
nese, traders. According to a recent report, a thousand Chi-
nese have decided to pack up and leave East Timor. 
After the troops moved into Dili , one resident reported, 
the "ninjas" began to operate in outlying villages instead. 
Residents also reported continuing arrests and harassment, 
and said that four young men, arrested on 17 February, had 
"disappeared" (Reuter, 20 Feb]. 
According to a source who was in contact with Irish jour-
nalist David Shanks, this is all part of a "very, very system-
atic and careful elimination" of young men whose "political 
attitude is not right . . . Young people are picked up in the 
fields and disappeared -- anyone with any sentiment of lib-
eration or independence." According to this source, Bishop 
Belo receives visits almost every day from parents coming to 
report the killing of their sons [Irish Times, 25 Feb]. 
While all this has been going on, foreign journalists have 
been denied access to East Timor, and police and military 
officials have said that they will not discuss the matter with 
the press [Reuter, 20 and 21 Feb.]. David Shanks of the Irish 
Times reported that his request to visit East Timor during a 
planned tripped to Indonesia was turned down. C> 
. . 
-~-
The 110/orious KOPASSUS retl berets 111archi11g i11 Dili. ft 1.5 
widely recog11ised Ilia/ these 1111its started the 11i11ja gangs. 
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Ninjas are not new to East Timor. This kind of terror was 
employed in 199 l and was associated at the time with 
Prabowo, the army officer son-in~law of President Suharto. 
There is no evidence to suggest he is involved this time. In 
fact his close associate at that time, Abilio Osorio Soares, 
who is now governor of East Timor has apparently fallen out 
of favour and was ordered to leave East Timor for six months 
to attend a course of study. 
Arrests, disappearances and trials 
One Reuter report [20 Feb] made reference to a man who 
is probably Henrique Belmiro, whose arrest and subsequent 
torture were reported in TAPOL Bulletin 127. The report 
noted that he remained in police custody, and that a relative 
who had visited him had seen signs of torture. 
Others arrested are David Ximenes, Nano Karbelo and 
Mau Hunu. Their arrests prompted the Jakarta-based Joint 
Committee for the Defence of East Timorese to write to the 
Dili chief-of-police on 15 February expressing dismay at re-
ports that the three were in the hands of the notorious Joint 
Intelligence Unit or SG/ which is an infringement of the 
Criminal Procedural Code according to which suspects 
should be investigated by the police and their cases handed 
on to the public prosecutor, if charges are to be made. The 
Committee said that Ximenes was a client of theirs. Ximenes 
recently completed a long term of imprisonment in Jakarta's 
Cipinang Prison. 
Mau Hunu, a guerrilla leader, was arrested in the after-
math of Xanana Gusmao' s arrest and has for some time been 
held in semi detention, occasionally being presented to jour-
nalists as a convert to integrasi. His re-arrest suggests that 
the conversion was not for real. 
More details have come to light concerning the East 
Timorese youths who "disappeared" after the 9 January dem-
onstration at the University of East Timor. At least five of the 
students who were involved have not been seen since the 
demonstration, and Indonesian police admitted late in Feb-
ruary that these five are considered to be "missing" [Reuter, 
28 Feb] . Residents of Dili report that five bodies wrapped in 
rice sacks have been discovered, and they suspect that these 
are the bodies of the missing students. Other sources report 
that nine, rather than five, Timorese students were killed af-
ter the demonstration, shot by soldiers from Battalion 744 
(the "Timorese battalion") at their headquarters. They also 
report that, when the father of one of the young men went to 
battalion headquarters to enquire after his son, he too was 
shot dead. 
Meanwhile, according to police chief Sugianto, 11 East 
Timorese and one man from Sulawesi will be standing trial 
over the riots in Baucau on 1 January, and 16 Timorese 
youths will be tried over the 9 January demonstration. 
Those arrested on 9 January will be charged under Article 
154 of the Criminal Code for "insulting the President". 
Trials of a number of people involved in incidents on 12 
and 13 November have begun. The prosecutor's office says 
that 18 or 19 people will be put on trial. The first six were 
tried in January, charged under Article 187 (arson) and Ar-
ticle 55 (inciting others to commit a crime). 
Bobby Xavier tortured 
Bobby Xavier is worth a special mention. He was one of 
several Timorese youths tried and sentenced in 1992 for al-
legedly killing a Timorcsc on the premises of Motael Church 
on 28 October 1991 . No charges were ever brought for the 
killing of Sebastiao Gomes who was killed on the same day 
and whose death was being commemorated on 12 November 
that year when the Santa Cruz massacre took ylace. Bobby 
served most of his sentence in Kupang, West Tu~1or an~ was 
released last October. He returned to Dili and 1mmed1ately 
became immersed in pro-independence protest. 
A colleague smuggled a letter abroad in March ~escribing 
what happened to him. Less than a month after his release, 
Bobby took part in the protests that shook Dili froID: 12 to 18 
November and later went into hiding. After returrung home 
to celebrate Christmas with his family, Bobby was rearrested 
on 26 December and heavily tortured: 
He was tied to an iron chair and wires fastened to his 
body. He was then given electric shocks and beaten till he 
fell unconscious to the floor. After regaining consciousness, 
the torture continued as soldiers under the command of 
Lt.Col. Amir slashed his forehead with a razor. Bobby told 
me others captured with him and held because of the Novem-
ber protests were similarly tortured. When delegates of the 
International Red Cross visited the place where they were 
detained, one detainee named Antonio Aitahan Malak ig-
nored warningsfrom their captors and told the visitors the 
truth about their treatment. In retaliation, after the Red 
Cross officials left, he was severely tortured again and forced 
to drink his own urine. 
The Dili contact said that, after hearing that he might be 
killed, Bobby managed to escape and again went into hiding. 
Arrests follow Liquisa investigation 
Soon after the National Commission for Human Rights 
announced its findings following its investigation into the 
killing of six civilians in Liquisa. the police and army in Dili 
announced that thirty people had been arrested in Liquisa and 
Dili on 4 March. The detainees have not been identified. It is 
feared that some may be villagers who agreed to be ques-
tioned by the Commission in its search for evidence about the 
atrocity. * 
continued from page 24 
to the army in security. But with the widening gap between 
the palace andthe army, Suharto relies more and more on the 
police. Police officers get better training, receive modem 
equipment but above all have won more prestige and power. 
In many places, not least in East Timar, the police are play-
ing an increasingly important role in security. The police now 
have yet another chance to flex their muscles. The worsening 
human rights situation in Indonesia these days has much to 
do with the frenzied activities of the police. 
International protest 
Within hours of the first news of the arrests of AJI mem-
bers, the International Federation of Journalists in Brussels 
had issued a resounding call to its members in 92 countries 
to "protest most strongly at this campaign of intimidation". 
General Secretary Aidan White announced that the IFJ would 
be sending an international mission of solidarity to Indonesia 
to investigate the crisis. The IFJ accepted AJJ as a member 
within weeks of its birth. 
Protests and letters to President Suharto also came from 
the New York-based Committtee to Protect Journalists and 
the London-based Article XIX which last year produced a 
major report on press freedom in Indonesia. Amnesty Inter-
national was quick off the mark with an Urgent Action. TA-
POL also came out with a Press Release and Urgent Action. 
The Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation also issued a strong 
statement condemning the arrests and announcing that it had 
formed a defence team to help those facing possible trial. 
Other organisations like Infight and LBH Nusantara have 
also issued strong statements against the arrests. 
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East Timor becoming central to Indonesian politics 
The killing of 6 villagers in Liquisa was headline news in the Indonesian press for many weeks. 
Several political weeklies focused attention on East Timor. There has been a major shift in reporting 
and public opinion. Indonesian society is becoming more aware of the fundamental issues involved 
The turning point was the Santa Cruz massacre in No-
vember 1991. Before the bloodbath, reporting on East Timor 
in the Indonesian press was minimal, mostly reflecting the 
government's version. Reading between the lines, which has 
become a habit for readers of the heavily controlled Indone-
sian press, was the only way to get some inkling of the reali-
ties in East Timor. Since the Santa Cruz massacre, several 
factors have contributed to the change in perceptions. 
For many Indonesians the Santa Cruz tragedy was an eye-
opener; it helped them realise that there was something fun-
damentally wrong in East Timor. In addition, there was the 
international outcry; instead of being an isolated issue in a 
faraway place, East Timor was now firmly on the interna-
tional agenda. The Indonesian press and some well-informed 
Indonesians were well aware that the government was having 
to cope with massive international pressure. The sacking of 
three senior officers and the jail sentences, albeit derisory, 
passed against several junior officers who were held respon-
sible for the wrongdoings at Santa Cruz, was unprecedented. 
Since then, news from East Timor has become a regular fea-
ture in the press. Although most reporting was heavily bi-
ased, some journals took an independent line, particularly the 
weekly magazines Tempo, Editor and DeTIK which were 
banned in June 1994. Reporting in the daily press has also 
improved enormously. 
A few years ago only glowing reports about developments 
in East Timor appeared. Nowadays there is mention of the 
huge unemployment problems and ethnic tensions between 
the Timorese and Indonesian migrants. The re-emergence of 
ninjas, masked and hooded gangs, has been well reported in 
the press. 
The increased volume of news in the international media 
and regular reports by the BBC World Service, Radio Neder-
land and Radio Australia have also contributed to a greater 
understanding of the issues among news-hungry Indonesians. 
The truth about East Timor is not hidden any more for the 
Indonesian public, and the facts can be obtained in many 
ways. 
The issue gathers momentum 
Incidents occurred one after the other; from 12 November 
1991 to the Liquisa killings of 12 January 1995, there were 
23 actions in East Timor. In 1994, at least fourteen demon-
strations by Timorese were reported in the Indonesian press. 
The arrest and trial of Xanana Gusmao was a major event; 
his ability, locked away in Cipinang prison in Jakarta, to keep 
in the news has made him a household name. Frequent con-
demnations of Indonesia by the international community 
created enough material for press reports as well as spin-offs 
like the creation of Komnas HAM, the National Commission 
of Human Rights, initiated by President Suharto himself. This 
commission was seen by most human rights activists in Indo-
nesia as a face-saving device of the government against the 
many attacks from foreign governments on human rights 
violations. The Santa Cruz massacre undoubtedly paved the 
way for the establishment of Komnas HAM, an assertion that 
would be vehemently denied by the Indonesian authorities. 
The persistent actions by Timorese youth, directly or indi-
rectly organised by the Timorese clandestine movement, has 
also contributed to growing awareness of the Indonesian pub-
lic. In particular the huge demonstration on 14 July 1994 at 
Universitas Timtim in Dili and the daring act of twenty-nine 
Timorese on 12 November who occupied the US embassy · 
grounds in Jakarta were reported under banner headlines in 
the national press. The many actions of the Timorese helped 
to shatter the myth that anti-Indonesia sentiments were 
merely an expression of a ' tiny majority of Timorese fanned 
by some anti-Indonesia groups abroad '. The Timorese resis-
tance has matured over the years and their well-planned ac-
tions in East Timor as well as in several cities in Java and 
Bali are making it far more difficult for the Indqnesian se-
curity forces. 
A picket-line outside the ftldo11esia11 Embassy i11 Ma11ila. East 
Timor solidarity work is spreading to all comers of the globe. 
Greater global awareness of the East Timor drama and the 
continuous tensions in the region itself has had an impact on 
political life in Jakarta . At different levels the East Timor 
issue has moved centre stage. The APEC summit in Novem-
ber 1994 was a clear example of how Timorese students filled 
the television screens around the world with their actions . 
The summit, surrounded as it was by e:xcessi\"e securitv 
measures, paled into insignificance. -The deeds of th~ 
Timorese had a tremendous impact on the Indonesian 
authorities. The flamboyant Major-General Hendropryono, 
the Jakart:-i military commander. was held responsible and 
was sacked by Suharto. 
Growing tensions between Bina Graha (President Su-
harto's office) and Cilangkap (Armed Forces headquarters ) 
arc being played out these days with East Timor as the battle-
ground. The Liquisa killings [sec separate item] is another 
example of how Suharto is using his powers to remove mil i-
tary opponents because of developments in East Timor. C> 
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National Commission 
The inquiry by Komnas HAM (National Commission of 
Human Rights) into the Liquisa killings created its own mo-
mentum and once again became front page news. From the 
beginning it was clear that members of the Commission were 
not impressed by the army's version of events. 
~lie actio11 duri11g the APEC conference which caught the head-
li11es e1•erywhere. . 
The two visits to East Timor prompted interesting state-
ments by me~bers of the team. Prof. Muladi, a jurist .and 
Dean of the Dtponegoro State University in Semarang, Cen-
tral Java said: "A(ihough it (East Timor) has been part of 
Indonesia for nearZv 20 years, conditions are unchanged. . 
Surely there must be something wrong. Now we need to know 
what is actually wrong" (Kompas, 27 Febr. 1995). Prof. Mu-
ladi questioned the development programme. Referring to the 
the many roads that have been built, he said: "Is this really 
what the people want?", adding that maybe they need coop-
eratives or other forms of development. · . 
Another Comlllission member, Marzukf Uarusman . went 
further, dedar1ng that a policy -review is needed. During his 
visits, he g~ined the impression that an increasing number of 
people are disillusioned with the results of integrasi. It does 
appear that members of the Commission met a much wider 
range of East Timorese than is normally the case of visiting 
Indonesian officials. Nurcholis Madjid, another member of 
the Commission, that the commission decided to speed up 
their Liquisa inquiry because of the flood of letters from · 
abroad about the incident. [Bernas, 28.II .1995] As for 
Darusman, he frankly acknowledged that information avail-
able to Commission members from abroad is often not avail-
able from the government. [Republika, 20.11.1995] 
The Liquisa investigation will be a testcase for the credi-
bility and independence of Komnas HAM. The commission 
has grown in prominence; more citizens are filing their 
complaints with the Commission. Human rights organisa-
tions abroad and at home will constantly scrutinise its work ; 
it will either function as an extension of the government and 
or it will act as a kind of Ombudsman. 
East Timor as part of the strategy 
While government ministries like Foreign Affairs and the 
Interior as well as the security apparatus are these days being 
forced to fill their days with Timor affairs, this holds true for 
other strata in soc iety . The view that East Timor is a colony 
of Indonesia is not longer uncommon. But a variety of views 
are circulating among Indonesian NGOs on how to deal with 
the East Timor issue. Some mainstream NGOs don't want to 
touch the issue, still regarding it as the kiss of death. Such a 
view dates back several years when the East Timor issue was 
still seen as a taboo. These NGOs fear that that the security 
apparatus will immediately clamp down on their activities if 
they make an issue of East Timor. 
Along similar lines but in a kind of quasi-theoretical 
framework some NGOs argue that as agents of change, their 
role lies in bringing about fundamental change in Jakarta. 
Once changes have occurred in Jakarta, the pre-conditions 
will exist for change in Dili. The followers of this theory, 
former Orde Baru proponents but now strongly anti-Suharto, 
also argue that raising the issue of East Timor will ultimately 
strengthen the regime: Suharto will close the ranks with the 
military and all the different military fractions will join forces 
to face tlie East Timor proponents. 
But a growing number of young human rights and politi-
cal activists have adopted a principled stance on East Timor, 
taking the same position as the Timorese resistance. The 
Timorese Peace Plan has been published in Bahasa Indone-
sian along with important statements by Xanana Gusmao. 
There is growing admiration for young Timorese who have 
time and again captured centre stage. The theory that change 
in Jakarta must come first first ·is rejected for a variety of 
reasons. Human rights violations in East Timor are blatant 
and for this reason alone, East Timor should be highlighted. 
Moreover !he spotlight on East Tirnor has gravely tarnished 
Indonesia 's international image, making it easier to raise 
human rights issues in Indonesia itself like the freedom of 
association and freedom of the press. Timorese petitioners at 
the UN Human Rights Commission have thernsleves raised 
those issues alongside the East Timor issue. This will only 
strenghten the. campaign on human rights violations in gen-
eral in · Indonesia and put the Indonesian government further 
onto the defensive 
The Liq_uisa-killings 
The ~i~uisa killings have again thrust East Timor into the 
centre oflndonesian politics . From many different angles the 
Liquisa. <::~se·- ref1:ects .the growing awareness of the public on 
Timor -affairs . ·The version produced by platoon leader Lt. 
Jeremias Kase and backed by his superiors has been contra-
dicted by the press and by statements of individual members 
of Komnas HAJ.J. Top-ranking military officers and Suharto's 
spokesperson Moerdiono were forced to admit that there had 
been a "violation of procedures" . That the six killed were 
innocent villagers, confirmed by different sources, has be-
come the accepted version of the more informed sections in 
the Indonesian society. 
The uproar that greeted the Liquisa tragedy reflects the 
· political .changes that have taken place in society. The heavily 
corporatist pohtical structure is gradually disintegrating. So-
ciety, in particular the middle class, now demands more 
openness and believes that voicing different or even contra-
dictory views is no longer taboo. East Timor, now at the cen-
tre of the int~rnational and domestic agenda, is helping to 
accelerate tlu~ process of pluriformity. There are good 
grounds to believe that the East Timor issue could hasten the 
process of change in Jakarta and become an important factor 
for the process of democracy and improvement of human 
rights. If. 
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Human Rights High Commissioner to visit East Timor 
Once again, when appalling human rights abuses are occurring in East Timor, the United Nations 
Human Rights Commission opted for a "consensus statement" on East Timor, rather than the 
strongly-worded resolution which the Timorese, and solidarity groups, had hoped for. The compari-
son with 1992, when a consensus statement was passed only months after the Santa Cruz massacre, 
is unavoidable. 
The statement, released on 28 February, does at least ex-
press "deep concern" over reports of human rights violations, 
and, more significantly, calls for the UN High Commissioner 
for Human Rights, Jose Ayala Lasso, to visit East Timor in 
1995. Nevertheless, it is a very disappointing document. 
With the powerful report of the Special Rapporteur on 
Extrajudicial Executions, Bacre Waly Ndiaye, having been 
presented at the session, devastating new revelations of the 
executions in Liquisa and the "ninja" terror in Dili receiving 
international attention, a strong resolution was expected. 
Although Portugal and Ireland pressed for a stronger 
stand, they did not receive the support they expected from 
other European Union countries and other Western countries. 
The United States was preoccupied with the attempt to put 
forward a resolution condemning the human rights situation 
in China, while France was concerned largely with Chech-
nya. It may also be the case that the countries strongly sup-
porting East Timar were persuaded to step back on the 
grounds that a resolution at this time might jeopardise the 
"all-inclusive talks" between Timorese, currently due to take 
place in Salzberg, Austria from 24-26 April under UN aus-
pices. 
The Timorese delegates to the Commission issued a 
multi-party statement on l March, signed by representatives 
of CNRM, FRETlLIN, UDT and RENETIL. It makes the 
point that "The EU, having opted for a Chairman's state-
ment, and other members ... who favoured this approach, are 
now under moral responsibility to ensure the full implemen-
tation by the government of Indonesia of all its commitments 
contained in the 1992, 1994 and 1995 Chairman's state-
ments. It is the credibility of the EU and the WEAO (West 
Europe and Others) and in fact of the CHR members as a 
whole that is at stake" 
The statement goes on remind CHR members that "not 
one single provision contained in the 1992 and 1994 Chair-
man's statements has been implemented by the Indonesian 
government ... The Indonesian dictatorship, in the manner 
and tradition of all dictatorships, has never shown good faith 
or willingness to reform itself and abide by the democratic 
will of the people and the rule of law. Hence, the East 
Timorese do not have anv illusions that this time the Indone-
sian military rulers will honour their commitments to the 
international community." The statement also notes that the 
human rights situation in East Timor has deteriorated dra-
matically, as documented by Amnesty International, Human 
Rights Watch/Asia, and others. 
The Timorese delegates express a guarded hope that this 
statement seems slightly stronger than the 1992 and 1994 
statements, and suggests that "the Indonesian delegation 
faced the prospect of a strong resolution if it did not negotiate 
in good faith and accept several substantive provisions." 
It appears that the visit of the Human Rights Commis-
sioner, at least, will take place, though no date has yet been 
set. Irawan Abidin, spokesman for the Foreign Ministry, said 
the Indonesian government would "welcome" the visit of 
Lasso, the highest-ranking UN official to visit East Timor, 
and hoped that he would present a more "balanced" view of 
the situation (Reuter, 2 March) . 
However, it is also important to ensure that the visits of 
the several thematic rapporteurs which the statement calls for 
should also take place. Though less high-ranking than Lasso, 
the special rapporteurs and working groups are more likely to 
issue substanstial reports, like that of Ndiaye. 
Scepticism borne out 
Within days of the 'consensus statement' being signed, 
Jakarta was showing it had no intention of acting accord-
ingly. On the one hand, dozens of people were arrested in 
Liquisa and Dili in early March, while on the other, the In-
donesian government seemed content upon sabotaging the 
'all-inclusive talks between East Timorese. It began to chal-
lenge the right of the UN to draw up the list of invitees and 
issue the invitations. Their idea seems to be to tum these 
talks into a slightly broader version of the "reconciliation 
talks" that were held twice in the UK in 1993 and 1994 
which were under Jakarta 's control. * 
continued from page 8 
at length testimony from East Timer resistance leader Ra-
mos-Horta about recent use of Hawk aircraft in East Timer, 
she challenged the government to investigate this evidence. 
Human rights are a factor in deciding whether to issue an 
export licence, along with design and capability as well as 
assurances from the recipient government about equipment 
not being used for internal repression. But because decisions 
are not open to public scrutiny, she said that it was difficult to 
challenge the basis on which any decision was made. 
Referring to claims by Tory MP, Patrick Nicholls, follow-
ing a visit to Indonesia and East Timer that the human rights 
situation is improving, Ann Clwyd said the claim does not 
bear scrutiny. "We get very angry when we hear the apolo-
gists for the Indonesian regime constantly making unsustain-
able assertions that the human rights record is improving. " 
Replying, Minister of State Alastair Goodlad defended 
arms sales to Indonesia and said "we need ro see evidence 
racher than unsubstantiated assertions", claiming that for-
eign visitors to East Timor had not reported Hawk sightings. 
[Are they likely to be left around when foreign visi tors are 
present?] He repeated the government's assertion that it is 
"through constructive dialogue within wider relationships" 
that human rights improvements will come about. 
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CNRM co-chair visits the UK 
. . t the CNRM visited the Jose Ramos-Horta, the co-chair of the East Tzmorese resistance mo~emen ' if Commons 
UK in February and was received by a Minister of State. He was received at the H:iuse? d the East 
by Opposition spokesperson for foreign affairs, Ann Clwyd MP, who has.repefiate ;f ~a!/;~or 
Timor issue on the floor of the House, and Lord Avebury of Parliamentarians or as · · 
Meeting with Minister Goodlad 
The government's decision for Ramos-Horta to be re-
ceived for the first time by Minister of State at the Foreign 
Office Alastair Goodlad signals a shift in the government's 
position. The Times [ 1.11.1995] described the meeting as 
"confirmation that (the government's) patience over Indone-
sia's refusal to compromise, despite years of United Nations 
entreaties, is rapidly running out". Clearly also, the govern-
ment was unable to ignore the strength of public opinion in 
Britain about East Timor. Ramos-Horta outlined the CNRM's 
Peace Plan. Minister Goodlad was clearly interested in hear-
ing the details. He assured the East Timor representative that 
the British government does not recognise Indonesia's an-
nexation of East Timor. 
Ramos-Horta addressed a meeting at the Grand Commit-
tee Room of the House of Commons convened by the Parlia~ 
mentary Group on Human Rights, chaired by Lord Avebury. 
He outlined the CNRM' s efforts to work for an agreement 
with Indonesia in a way that would allow the colonial power 
to disentangle itself from East Timor with the least damage to 
its diplomatic standing. Ann Clwyd MP, Labour Party 
spokesperson for foreign affairs and human rights, who vis-
ited East Timor in 1989, described her efforts to extract in-
formation from the Government about its relations with In-
donesia. 
Ramos-Horta also met Labour Shadow Foreign Secretary 
Robin Cook, Shadow Defence Secretary David Clarke, Sir 
David Steel, president of the Liberal International and a 
number of left-wing Labour MPs. 
. Public meetings 
More than three hundred people attended a pubttc meet-
Parliamentary round-up 
Since her appointment to the Labour Opposition foreign 
affairs team, responsible for Asia and human rights, Ann 
Clwyd, a long-time friend of East Tirµor, has devoted much 
time and energy .to pressing the government, through parlia-
mentary questions, for information about its trade and aid 
policy towards Indonesia. At an Amnesty International 
meeting in London on 25 February, she said that despite the 
government's commitment to 'good governance' principles in 
its aid programme, no aid .to Indonesia had.been withheld 
because of this criterion. She said it was important for the 
Labour Party to have its own list of the world's worst human 
rights offenders for whom no aid should be forthcoming. 
House of Commons debate 
On 15 December last year, Ann Clwyd initiated a debate 
in the House of Commons on Indonesia and East Timor. Such 
Demonstration in front of the British parllament. From left to 
right: Lord Avebury, Ann Clwyd MP and Jose Ramos Horta. 
ing organised by the BCET at which film-maker and journal-
ist John Pilger, and Carmel Budiardjo of T APOL also spoke. 
There has been a steady rise in the number of people at public 
meetings about East Timor in the past six months or so. 
There was also programme of events in Coventry, the lo-
cation of Alvis, manufacturers of the Scorpion tank. Besides 
attending a vigil at the factory, the East Timor leader met the 
Anglican Bishop of Coventry and addressed a well-attended 
meeting of trade unionist, peace and human rights activists 
convened by the Coventry trades council. The chair of the 
- council stressed that it was categorically opposed to the Alvis 
tank deal with Indonesia. 
debates _are rare as foreign affairs has such low priority in the 
Commons. Speaking for the best part of an hour, Ann Clwyd 
gave a detailed account of abuses .bY the Indonesian regime 
since its rise to power in 1965 and since the invasion of East 
Timor in 1975 . Insisting that the international community 
must share responsibility for these abuses, she said: 
The long and well-documented record of human rights 
violations in Indonesia and East Timor remains one of the 
greatest challenges to the international community in fulfill-
ing its obligation to promote and protect human rights. 
On the growing UK arms sales to Indonesia, she drew at-
tention to evidence from East Timorese that Hawk aircraft 
had been used in East Timor. She rejected the government's 
failure to monitor the end use of arms exports because "it is 
not practical to monitor their use once they have reached 
their destination"; yet other countries already do so. Quoting 
co11ti11ued 011 page 7 
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World-wide solidarity with East Tim or 
The two main regional networks for solidarity with East Timor, the informally organised network of 
European solidarity groups and the more formally organised APCET (Asia-Pacific Coalition for 
East Timor) have held meeting recently, the European network in Brussels from 17-19 January and 
APCET in Bangkok on 5-6 February. 
The APCET conference was attended by 
representatives of solidarity groups in nine countries, 
including Indonesia, and one CNRM representative, Abe 
Barreto Soares who now lives in Canada. The report from 
the Indonesian delegation was particularly interesting, and 
it was stressed that Pijar and INFODH (Indonesian 
Foundation for Human Dignity) intend to make East 
Timor a major part of their campaigning work. The 
solidarity movement is gaining momentum in many Asia-
Pacific countries; for instance, a demonstration was held 
in front of the Indonesian Embassy in Korea for this first 
time this year. 
Discussions of projects and actions included the need 
to raise awareness of the roles of Australia and Japan with 
regard to Indonesia; initiating a mission to East Timor by 
Parliamentarians for East Timor; producing a regular 
newsletter which will include a women's column; and 
ensuring an APCET presence at events including the UN 
Commission on Human Rights, the PP2 l preparatory 
~eting in Sri Lanka, the World Commission on Human 
Rights in Upsala, Sweden, in June, and the UN World 
Conference on Women in Beijing in September. Days of 
action were proposed for November 16, the beginning of 
the APEC meeting in Osaka (when there will be pickets at 
Indonesian Embassies throughout South-east Asia) and 
December 7, which the meeting proposed should be 
declared as the International Day for East Timor. 
The next APCET conference will take place in an 
ASEAN country, with preference going to Malaysia if this 
proves to be possible. 
The meeting of European solidarity groups in Brussels 
included representatives from thirteen countries, and from 
three Timorese organisations, CNRM, UDT and Renetil, 
the latter represented by Domingo Sarmento Alves, who 
organised the occupation of the US Embassy in Jakarta last 
November. 
This meeting also stressed the importance of December 7 
as a joint day of action; SOS Timor, the Brussels-based 
solidarity group, volunteered to produce resource materials 
for actions on that day. There was considerable discussion of 
how to work more effectively in the European Parliament and 
other European institutions. At the leve of the United 
Nations, it was felt to be very important to press for the visits 
of the revelent special rapporteurs and thematic working 
groups as soon as possible. Some progress has been made on 
the campaign for an arms embargo on Indonesia (Belgium, 
Sweden and Italy have agreed to stop arms sales), but this 
still needs a lot of work and continues to be an important 
focus of campaigning. It was also felt to be important to step 
up campaigning on behalf of Timoresc political prisoners. 
There was a long discussion of the issue of Indonesian 
migration into East Timar, and a feeling that it was urgent to 
press for an immediate halt to all new migration. Several 
possible actions were suggested for groups to take on this 
The perso11-size poster produced by ET/SC, the Irish Solidarity-
Campaig11, for campaig11i11g purposes. 
issue, and it was also stressed that more research on 
migration and population issues should be done. 
As well as 7 December. days suggested for actions 
included 16-19 November (picketing of Japanese Embassies 
was suggested), and the 50th anniversary of Indonesian 
independence on 17 August. In Britain. there will be a focus 
as well on the commemoration of the 1975 murder of five 
journalists at Balibo on 16 October. and in Germany there 
will be large actions around the Hanover Messe arms fair. 
which Suharto himself is expected to attend. 
A growing movement 
The most recent additions to the world solidarity movement 
for East Timar arc in Denmark, Northern Ireland, Sri Lanka 
and South Korea. In Britain, many local Coalitions for East 
Timor have been founded in the past year. 
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Major top-level ABRI reshuffle 
The relations between Suharto and top-level ABRI (Indonesian armed forces) officers are 
strained, to say the least The removal of General W1Smoyo, ·the army chief-of-staff, is a clear 
example of the growing tensions between Bina Graha, the President's office, and Cilangka.p, 
(ABRI headquarters). 
General Wismoyo had all the neCessary qualifications t9 become 
ABRI's Number One. In the seventies he served as Suharto's 
adjutant during which time, he became close to the First Family. 
Relations became even more intimate when he married the 
younger sister of Madam Tien Suharto. These two connections 
became the gateway for a brilliant career in the anny. Although 
he never shone while he was a cadet, his career rocketed and 
within ten years, Wismoyo had reached the top echelons of the 
army. 
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The outgoing man General. Wismoyo, al.ready in ciiilian dress, 
and the new man, General. Hartono. 
But there was a major flaw in his life-style: he is a notorious 
womaniser which sister-in-law Madam Tien, who upholds strict 
Victorian values about marriage, took seriously. Although he was 
destined to become Pangab (Commander-in-Chief) of ABRI, 
Wismoyo's many liaisons became his downfall . Already in 
January this year, i.t was apparent that Wismoyo would be ditched 
and sent into retirement. He was offered either a post as 
ambassador or chairman of the Indonesian Olympic Committee, 
as a face-saving device. The obstinate general grudgingly 
accepted only the last offer and will now join the ranks of the 
growing number of disgruntled generals. 
The downfall of Wismoyo had been expected for months 
and it came as no surprise to the general public. 
Growing conflict 
The Wismoyo case is a prime example of the strained relations 
between Suharto and the top echelons of ABRI. Political analysts 
in Jakarta now speak about ABRI Cendana or ABRI Joya/is for 
officers close to Suharto and ABRI Merah Putih (the Indonesian 
flag) or ABRI Sapia Marga (the military oath) for the majority of 
officers who do not see loyalty to the armed forces as being 
synonymous with loyalty to Suharto. Those in the latter group, 
mostly groomed in the eighties, the period when General Benny 
Murdani was cornrnander-in<hief, are now drifting away from 
the president 
The political views of ABRI officers up to l %5 covered a wide 
spectrum, reflecting the many political parties and ideologies they 
supported or espoused. After the Suharto takeover, a wide-
ranging · shake-up took place, creating a smooth working 
relationship between Suharto and the generals as the core of the 
Orde Baru. Though rifts appeared in the early seventies, Suharto 
managed to maintain a steady alliance with most of the officers . 
Only after 1980, when Suharto began to impose a strongly 
personalised style of government, did important sections of ABRI 
start to display open discord. As Indonesian civil society is now 
beginning to show signs of a return to the pluralistic political 
society of the fifties, the military have begun to express the same 
tendencies. 
Suharto's style of riding in tandem with ABRI is now a thing of 
the past and a different set of criteria now applies for an offi-
cer to rise to the top. In theory ABRI has its own mechanism 
for determining suitability for an officer's selection for a post 
but Suharto has the final say as Panglima Tertinggi (Supreme 
Commander). At the end of the day, it is Suharto who, after 
getting advice from Cilangkap, will make the decision 
Adjutants, loyalty above all 
During the era when General Benny Murdani was ABRI 
Commander-in-Chief, top-ranking military officers had similar 
qualifications: they had had a stint of combat in East Timor, had 
completed a course at SESKOAD (the Command and General 
Staff College) and, preferably, originated from intelligence ranks 
and/or KOPASSUS, the elite red-beret commando troops. The 
Benny era is now over and the three major waves of personnel 
changes, from January 1994 up to February 1995, have been 
characterised by a phasing out of all Murdani elements, de-
Benny-isasi, as it is commonly called. It is estimated that fifty 
per cent of army officers are considered to be Benny loyalists and 
regarded by the Suharto group as potential dissenters. Suharto 
has now dispensed with all the Benny criteria and put in its place 
one simple criterion: undying loyalty to Suharto. Arbi Sanit, a 
lecturer at the University of Indonesia, put it like this: 
"The main reason is the centralised system of power. The New 
Order rule is increasingly centralised The selection of the elite 
will be more closely scrutinised Within the military itself we see 
criticism. From inside we notice the power of the executive 
growing while criticism from outside is also mounting. This 
makes recruitment by the ruler more selective. Those who are 
close to the president are close to power. The trusted and loyal 
ones are the adjutants. [Sinar, 11 Febr. 1995] 
In the last few weeks this criterion has been used to excess: 
Major-General Wiranto was appointed Jakarta military 
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commander; Ret'd Field Marshall Soepandi became the director 
of Gamela, the national airlines; Brig. General Dibyo Widodo 
became the Jakarta Chief of Police. Lt. General Soejono became 
the Chief of Staff of the General Staff. All four had served stints 
as adjutants to Suharto. Previous adjutants who managed to get 
to the top are Ret'd General Try Sutrisno (Vice-Pres~dent of ~e 
Republic), ret'd Police General Kunarto ~former Na~onal Police 
Chief), ret'd Marshall Siboen (former Air Force Chief-of-Staff), 
Admirals Muhanunad Ari.fin and Tanto Koeswanto (former and 
present Navy Chiefs-of-Staff), ret'd Major General Kentot 
Harseno (former Jakarta Military Commander) and Lt. General 
Soeryadi (former Anny Vice-Chief of Staff). 
Major reshuffle 
Loyalty to Suharto was definitely the main theme behind the 
January reshuffle. Wismoyo's retirement came about not only 
because of his extra-marital affairs but first and foremost beq\use 
of his personal views. It is said that_on one occasion he told a 
group of colonels: "If it is the-peopTe 's wish that Suharto should 
be replaced, I will follow their wish". Another popular Wismoyo 
anecdote is the story of the wrist-watch. On one occasion, 
Wismoyo told a group of officers with some passion what loyalty 
means in military terms. "If you are told by your superior to 
wear your watch on the right hand, then that is what you will 
do". Since then, many ABRJ officers have worn their wrist-
watches on their right hand as a sign of support for ABRI Merah 
Putih or even of being anti-Suharto. Wismoyo's removal had 
been expected for months; recently his followers have been busy 
preparing a manuscript of his memoirs. The book will be in the 
book shops in March. 
The recent wide-ranging reshuffle wrought profound changes. 
Graduates from the 1965 and 1966 classes of the National 
Military Academy (AMN) have been moved into key positions. 
In particular the class of '65 has now assumed a central role in 
the army. Eight out of the ten territorial military commanders are 
from the AMN Class of '65. The new deputy for social and 
political affairs, which is a key post, will be Major-General 
Mochammad Ma'ruf of the '65 class. Some key figures like Vice 
Chief of Staff Lt.General Soeryadi (AMN '64) and Chief of the 
General Staff Lt.General Mantiri (AMN '62) have been offered 
ambassadorial posts. . . . .. 
The formal procedure for ABRJ promotions is in the hands of a 
team called Wanjakti. Usually the team's choice proceeds without 
difficulty but for key positions President Suharto sometimes 
decides otherwise. The promotion or downfall of key officers is 
still the prerogative of the old man. 
Deep divisions 
Suharto's meddling in the appointment of key persons at 
Cilangkap has created deep divisions among the generals. 
General Feisal Tandjung, the ABRJ Commander-in-Chief is a 
staunch Suharto loyalist who has recently had frequent conflicts 
with Army Chief-of-Staff General Wismoyo. With the ousting of 
Wismoyo and the appointment of General Hartono as Chief-of-
Staff, Suharto has managed tci place two loyalists at the top of the 
ABRI hierarchy. Feisal Tandjung and Hartono are expected to 
cleanse Cilangkap from Benny Murdani 'contamination', the 
expression used by palace circles. 
Indonesian analysts often describe Murdani as Suharto's 
nemesis. Bred and groomed for many years by Suharto, Murdani 
became too influential and had to be discarded. He was pensioned 
off, a trick played towards many of his men. the liquidation of 
BAIS (Badan Jntelijen Strategis, Armed Forces Strategic 
Intelligence Agency) in 1994 was a heavy blow for the Murdani 
group. BAIS was Murdani's last institutional stronghold. In 
further reshuffles, intelligence officers close to Murdani were 
sidestepped. BIA. the replacement of BAIS is a much sanitised 
version and is no longer directly under theABRI Commander. 
MILITARY 
The 'civilian' Murdani rarely appears on the front pages these 
days but he still exerts influence among the more senior officers. 
Although seemingly powerless, Murdani together with an 
increasing number of disgruntled officers could emerge if a 
political crisis were to occur. 
General Hartono, the back-seater 
General Hartono, the new army chief-of-staff and previously the 
chief of staff for social and political affairs (Kassospol) has 
already proven his credentials. Earlier Kassospols were staunch 
ABRJ Merah Putih advocates and created many problems for 
Suharto's domestic policies~ H.artono is qllite different He openly 
advocates the .position of 'ABRI taking a back-seat' and is openly 
sympathetic with ICM!, the Muslim Intellects' · Association, 
chaired by Minister for Research and Technology Rudy Habibie, 
a close Suharto trustie. 
The question of whether ABRI takes a leading or back-seat 
position has been one of the major discussions in Indonesian 
politics. Hartono is from AMN Class of '62 and originates from 
the cavalry which · has rarely produced officers at the top of the 
army. He is regarded as a brainy type. In 1976 he graduated from 
the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, 
US. In 1982 he graduated from the · Indonesian Staff and 
Command School (SESKOGAB) and in 1988 he c6nipleted a 
course at Lemhanas, the Institute for National Defence. In the last 
few years he has been promoted several times. From 1990 to 
1993 he was military commander in East Java before being 
appointed comander of SESKOGAB. After only a few months 
at the job, he was appointed governor of Lemhanas, another 
promotion, but that job didn't last long either. Early in 1994 he 
became Kassospo/, the Chief of Staff for Political and Social 
Affairs, arguably the most influential job after the army chief-of-
staff. The Kassospol is responsible for determining the role of the 
military in society and coordinates the appointment of all military 
officers in civilian functions, from cabinet ministers to village 
heads. 
The majority ofABRI officers take it for granted that the armed 
forces has a vanguard role in society: they have been doing so for 
more than thirty years. People like General Hartono accept a less 
prominent role for ABRI in society for a series of reasons. One is 
a re-interpretatio11 of the military doctrine Dwi Fungsi (dual 
function) which justifies military intervention in civilian matters. 
Back-seaters like Hartono argue that in order to improve the 
quality of the armed forces (its security and order functions), it 
should reduce its involvement in ci\ilian matters (social and 
political affairs). Retired General Suharto. in the early days of his 
rule a staunch Dwi Fungsi proponent. has for ob\ious rc.c1sons C> 
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moved to the 'A BRI back-seat position ' and has appointed 'back-
seaters' in prominent positions. 
Taking back-seat position does not mean that Hartono and 
others will accept a 'back to barracks' position. Their reasoning 
is primarily a political one: the all-out implementation of the Dwi 
Fungsi from the mid sixties had everything to do with the need 
for a reckoning with the PK.I, the Indonesian Communist Party. 
The situation is under better control now, justifying a switch from 
front-seat to back-seat. Nevertheless it should be clear that taking _ 
a back-seat does· not mean that the military will allow dvH Society. 
to detehnine its own course: military involvement in society will 
remain a pertnanenrfactor. 
The new Kassospoi Li.General Mochammad Ma'ruf has 
followed in the footsteps of General Hartoilo a.•d·-600n !deJ!tified 
himself as a staunch back-seater. In his maiden · ~h . 
Lt. General Mocharnrnad Ma' ruf commented that ABRI takes a 
back seat when it comes to politics and allowing civilians to take 
the initiative. To back this up, he quoted an ancient Javanese 
saying: tut wuri handayani, which means supervising from 
behind. He warned however that ABRI could change its position 
overnight and moved back to the front-seat (ing ngarso sung 
tu/odo) or middle position (ing madyo mangun karso). The active 
or more laid-back military position in civilian affairs is often 
called 'the· Turkish model' which covers a wide range of 
possibilities, from scrutinising a civilian government from the 
barracks to becoming a brutal military dictatorship. 
Hartono in full flow 
During his one-year stint as Kassospol (Chief of Social and 
Political Affairs), General Hartono was never idle. Army 
meddling in major issues is hardly a sign of taking a back seat. 
1994 was a particularly bad year for human rights in Indonesia: 
the crackdown and trial of labour activists, the clamp-down on 
the press and the actions against the Muslim organisation 
Nahdlatul Ulama and the nationalist party, the PD!, are just the 
tip of the iceberg. 
Human rights briefs 
Soothsayer hauled in for predictions 
A soothsayer who chairs the country's Association of Psy-
chics has been hauled in for interrogation because of his 
predictions about 1995 being a turbulent year. In particular 
his forceasts about likely successors to President Suharto are 
deemed to be "provocative and potentially disruptive to na-
tional stability", according to the Attorney-General's office. 
Permadi' s remarks were made in a radio interview in 
Yogyakarta, Central Java last year. A cassette of the inter-
view have been on sale for Rpl0,000 for some time. 
The most bruising prediction was that Megawati, daugh-
ter of the late President Sukarno, now chair of the PDI party, 
might succeed Suharto. "I mentioned her but she was only 
one of several possible successors" said Pennadi. 
Following a five-hour interrogation session, Permadi said: 
"It is a naive joke, a sign of an unhealthy situation in this 
country if such a prediction is considered as disturbing na-
tional stability." [AP, 16.III.1995] Pennadi criticised Central 
Java military commander Major-General Soeyono for saying 
Megawati should stay at home. "Why doesn't he say a similar 
thing about Mbak Tutut?" [Jakarta Post, 9.III.1995] Tutut, 
daughter of Suharto, is deputy chair of GOLK.AR and one of 
Indonesia 's richest business tycoons. 
The ruthless harassments of NU 's Abdurrachman Wahid and 
Megawati of the PDI are typical of the operations originating 
from the Kassospol office. Abdurraclunan Wahid, or Gus. Dur as 
he is popularly called, and Megawati lead movements which rep-
resent millions of people and are seen by Bina Graha, the pala~ 
clique, as a grave threat. Gus Dur, recently re-elected as . c~r­
man of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU}, the biggest Muslim orgarusation 
(with 25 to 30 million adherents, arguably the biggest org~sa­
tion in the world), is one obvious danger while MegawatI, the 
daughter of Sukarno, Indonesia's first president as chair of PD!, a 
federation of nationalist and Christian parties, could emerge as a 
-· viabl~ alternative to rule by Suharto. Ever since their ele~t:ions, 
Gus Dur and .Megawati have had to eooure aH manner ot slurs 
and have had to fend off numerous atacks. While attacks on 
Gus Dur have been rugh1y personallsed, empnasISmg. hlS -cl~se~­
connections with Benny Murdani and secular groups (mcluding 
activist NGOs), the attacks on Megawati have accused the PD! of 
harbouring communists. 
The ~~-c 0f NU and PD! joining ranks against the regime 
is creating nightmare5 for Uie Su..ii..!Lrto dio.uc~ Although so far. 
attempts to unseat Gus Dur and Megawati have been unsuccess-
ful, Hartono's efforts were rewarded by Suharto with his quick 
promotion as chief of staff. In other words, back-seatism is 
merely a question of loyalty. 
Indonesian society has become infinitely more complex 
than in the early days of Suharto' s rule. A burgeoning work-
ing class, the emergence of a plural middle class and nation-
wide social protests from the young generation are making it 
more difficult for Suharto to rule along the old lines. Stories 
about his deteriorating health are persistent and he has made 
no moves yet to appoint a successor. Even his most loyal 
supporters are getting worried about the lack of safe scenar-
ios. All the signs are that Suharto cannot take the risk of 
stepping down which means that he will opt for a seventh 
term in 1998. The prospect of Suharto clinging on will di-
minish the prospects of peaceful change. It will only exacer-
bate the antagonisms. Some anti-Suharto factions, not least 
those in the military, may see no other way than to force him 
o~ * 
Trial highlights campus paramilitaries 
The trial of twelve students from the National University 
in Jakarta, has drawn attention to the intimidating presence 
on campuses of army-backed student regiments known as 
Menwa. The twelve are on trial for destroying the campus HQ 
of the regiment last October. All are members of the Asso-
ciation of Nature Lovers whose own office came under attack 
from the paramilitaries and were acting in retaliation. A key 
issue being raised by the defendants is therefore: why has 
only one side in the clash been brought to justice? 
The twelve are being tried in two groups and all sessions 
have been attended by scores of student supporters who use 
every occasion to protest against the presence of student 
regiments on campuses throughout the country. The defen-
dants have appeared in court wearing black T-shirts with 
anti-Menwa graphics. At the end of one session, the defen-
dants grabbed their lawyers' microphone and made a speech 
condemning the regiments and shouted slogans like: "We 
want justice!" and "Ban the student regiments from campus" . 
The twelve stand accused under charges of assault and 
damage that could result in sentences of five and a half years. 
Menwa units have been challenged on many campuses be-
caus~ they are known _t<~ be an extension of army intelligence, 
keepmg an eye on acllv1sts and containing the level of student 
activism which has been on the upswing recently. There have 
been many calls for the regiments to be disbanded. 
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From errand boy to press tycoon 
Errand-boy-to-press-tycoon sagas used to be part of the dream of prewar AmerictL. But the success 
'<fnJ"y ;;f Harmoxo, infortr!_!l:tion minister for three terms, is typically Indonesian. His appointment as 
chair of GOLKAR in October TY9J turned him into one of the most powerful figures in the country. 
His most important asset, undying loyalty to Suharto, is tlie best way to get to the top. 
Achmad Harmoko started his journalistic career in the 
late fifties as an errand boy at Merdeka, one of the major na-
tionalist newspapers and gradually climbed from corrector to 
journalist. He also became known as a cartoonist .although al 
om: point the Communist daily Harian-Rakyat was able to 
prove that Harmoko had 'borrowed' a drawing from a Ger-
man cartoonist. His colleagues of those days remember him 
as an ambitious social climber. 
During the turmoil of 1965-67, when the military took 
over, Harmoko emerged as an energetic and relentless cam-
paigner against the PKJ, the Indonesian Communist Party 
and other allegedly left-wing organisations. Although he 
wasn't a leading figure in the action fronts, this period was 
the stepping stone to a brilliant career. Close working rela-
tions with fellow journalists at army newspapers opened 
many doors to the aspiring Harmoko. This hectic period was 
also characterised by the emergence of many sensational pulp 
newspapers, none of which lasted long. 
Pos Kota, a goldmine 
Harmoko recognised the huge opportunities in the market 
and in 1970 he started his proprietorial career with Pos 
Kota, the main ingredients of which are violence and sex. 
Within a few years, with a circulation of 600,000, the news-
paper emerged as the largest national newspaper. Often com-
pared with Rupert Murdoch and his pulp paper The Sun , 
Harmoko adopted the same strategy, using Pos Kota as his 
flagship to build a glittering media empire. In 1973 he be-
came chair of PW!, the union of journalists, which had al-
ready been purged of all so-called leftwing elements. He held 
the PW! chair for two terms and used the position to the lim-
its to expand his political and economic assets. A few years 
later he became a member of the Dewan Pers, the Press 
Council, officially the highest body in the media world. 
Pos Kota branched out with other publications like Pos 
Film (weekly), Terbit (daily), Majallah Film (weekly), War-
nasari (monthly), Bisnis Maritim (weekly), Aksi (weekly) and 
Sehat (weekly), a wide range of family, entertainment and 
youth magazines. The huge population of Indonesia, the 
fourth largest in the world, provides a lucrative market for the 
Harmoko kind of boulevard magazine. After becoming minis-
ter of information in 1983, his financial grip on the press 
expanded phenomenally. 
Greed is the name of the game 
Harmoko's nickname nowadays is the Dewa Pers Indone-
sia (God of the Indonesian Press), an appropriate name as 
Harmoko's name invariably pops up in every new publication 
as a shareholder. According to Jndependen, the journal of AJI 
(the new Association of Independent Journalists), Harmoko 
and his family own shares in at least 32 publications. Another 
source gives an even higher figure of 42 publications. The 
shares are either in Harmoko's name, that of Mrs. Sri Dhiyati 
Braze1111ess is Harmoko's asset. Others call him Hari-Hari 
Omong Kosong (Forever talki11g rubbish). 
(his wife) or Adi Sutrisno, Ali Usodo, Noor Slamet Asmo-
prawiro and Achmad Wibowo, all younger brothers of Har-
moko. 
Besides the Pos Kola Group, which remains at the core of 
Harrnoko's business activity, the Harmoko family owns 
shares in Citra (weekly), Bola (weekly), Surya (daily). Hop/a 
(weekly), Bernas (daily) and Jakarta Post (daily) - all part of 
the Gramedia Group, Kartini (bi-weekly) and Amanah (bi-
weekly) - part of the Kartini Group, Bisnis Indonesia (daily), 
Indonesian Business Weekly, Prospek (weekly), Sarinah 
(monthly), Pertiwi (monthly), Pelita (daily), Sportif 
(weekly). Senang (weekly), Gema Olahraga (weekly), Bin-
tang (weekly), Tiras (weekly), Sriwijaya Post (daily), Aneka 
(bi-weekly), Pesona (monthly), Nusra (daily), Gatra 
(weekly), Paron (bi-weekly), Komputek Computer IVorld 
(monthly), Citra (weekly) and Suara Pembaruan (daily). 
Harmoko also partly owns the private TV stations SCTV and 
ANTEVE and the private short-wave radio stations Radio 
Kayumanis and Radio Rakosa. 
Harmoko's business interests have also expanded beyond 
the media world. PT Metro Pos (printing industry) and PT 
Gede Karang (paper factory) were logical expansions of his 
press-empire. The Harmoko family has major interests in 
Paradiso Holidays Tours & Trm1els and in a video rental & 
production company, PT Golden Aiu/ti Cahaya Video. The 
family is also increasingly involved in the supply of news-
print. C> 
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'Empty shares' and new SIUPPs 
Most of the shares acquired by the Hannoko dynasty were 
acquired after his appointment as information minister in 
1983. The shares are known as saham kosong (empty shares) 
which means that Harmoko paid nothing for them. New pub-
lications need a SIUPP (press publication business licence) 
and it is the prerogative of the Minister of Information to 
issue or revoke these highly controversial permits. It is a 
public secret that Harmoko demands a percentage of the 
shares from the proprietor of any new publication in ex-
change for the SIUPP- 5, 10 or even 20%, depending on the 
negotiations. Two new publications Bisnis Indonesia and 
Indonesian Business Weekly only received their licence after 
Madam Sri Dhyati Hannoko was registered as a 20% share-
holder. 
Harmoko's greed goes beyond share-grabbing. lndepen-
den, AJJ's three-weekly journal which goes to press without 
a SIUPP, has reported that Harmoko also puts a price-tag on 
the granting of a SIUPP. For a big publishing group, it costs 
between 200 and 250 million rupiahs (US$100,000 to 
125,000) and a monthly fee of between 5 and 10 million 
rupiahs. Harn1oko has turned SIUPP-licensing into an effort-
less way of raking in easy bucks, a veritable goldmine. 
Another way of abusing the SIUPP system for easy profits 
is when internal conflicts occur within a publication. The 
SIUPP license is revoked, a compromise is arranged and a 
new SIUPP is issued, involving another money transaction. 
Or the publication is banned and allowed back under a new 
name, which means a new SIUPP and more money changing 
hands. 
In the Indonesian Constitution there are no restrictions on 
ministers engaging in business. Harmoko has become the 
supreme example of welding his government position and 
business interests into a lucrative combination. It has given 
him many assets but also many enemies. 
Censorship King 
By definition, the information minister is also in charge of 
censoring the press. Harmoko is a typical exponent of Orde 
Baru ideology which fears any ideology outside the state ide-
ology of Pancasi/a. In a speech to journalists the minister 
explained: 
Although communism has disappeared from Indonesian 
soil, we must remain on guard against extremist elements and 
those ideologies which threaten the state ideology Pan-
casila ... . The press should avoid the trappings of ~1beral ~nd 
communist ways of thinking and must not indulge m creating 
disturbances in the way the communist-backed press did rn 
the 1960s (Jakarta Post, 30 September 1993, quoted f~om 
The · Press Under Siege, Censorship in Indonesia, Article 
XIX, November 1994). 
Harmoko has indeed flexed his muscles. In 1984, his first 
year as information minister, a deer~ was issued giving the 
minister the power to revoke SJUPP hcences for_ n~t conform-
ing with the requirements. Since he ~e rmru~ter he has 
banned six major publcations: Prioritas m 1986, S~nar Hara-
pan in 1987, Monitor in 1990 and the,thr~ ~eeJ?res !empo, 
Detik, Editor in June 1994. Harmoko s m1mstenal st.Int has 
also become the era of what has become known as the budaya 
telpon (the phone culture), phoning editors ~tall hours of ~e 
night to instruct them on what or how to ~t~ about a certam 
topic or ordering them to refrain from wntmg about some-
thing. Many Indonesian journalists cannot understand how 
Hannoko, himself a former journalist, is not averse to im-
posing such 'self-censorship' on his former colleagues. 
King of Golkar 
In 1993 Hannoko was appointed chair of GOLKAR, the 
ruling party, which is also called the party of the ruler. This 
appoinment by President Suharto was quite unprecendented. 
GOLKAR was set up in 1964 by a group of army officers as a 
political counter-weight to the PKI, the Communist Party. 
After 1965, it was transformed into the political vehicle of the 
ruling clique round Suharto and always stuck to the tradition 
of having a retired army general as chairman. Harmoko's 
appointment was clearly meant to deflate the Dwi Fungsi 
which is used to justify the army's role in society, reflecting 
the growing gap between the president and the army [see 
separate article] . 
GOLKAR is a strange creature. Several Indonesianists 
have written lengthy books about it. It easily won all five 
elections held since 1972 with a built-in majority of more 
than two third of the votes. It has set up 27 provincial 
branches (including East Timor) with virtually unlimited 
funds at its disposal. GOLKAR is more an extension of the 
government and the civil service than a political party. In fact 
GOLKAR refused to b_e called a political party. Ever since its 
inception, GOLongan KARya (which stands for the 
'functionaries' group} has defined itself as an association 
untainted by any ideology. Nominally GOLKAR is a kind of 
federation with several components. · Harrnoko was given the 
task of turning GOLKAR into a more centralised structure 
with individual membership, the purpose of which has been 
to precipitate a decline in the army's influence. 
Obviously Suharto regards Harmoko as well fitted for the 
job. Harmoko certainly has qualities as an orator. By contrast 
with Suharto who sends people to sleep when he makes a 
speech, Hannoko is a lively speaker, a true populist. He in-
sists on being called Bung Harmoko, instead of the more of-
ficial Bapak, a way to popularise himself. His ability to con-
vey Suharto's wishes to a larger public along with his un-
flinching loyalty has earned him a prominent place at the 
core of the Suharto clique. In many authoritarian states, the 
roie of the information department is crucial, With his propa-
gandist qualities, Harmoko has served Suharto's purposes 
very well. In his youth, his ambition was to become a dalang 
( a puppeteer), a traditional story-teller. In many ways he has 
fullfilled his childhood dream. 
'As Instructed' 
Harmoko is also known in Jakarta as tokoh petunjuk 
(freely translated: somebody who works under instructions). 
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As infonnation minister he often meets the president to re-
ceiv~ instructions. When Harrnoko meets the press after 
leavmg Bina Graha, the presidential office, almost every 
other sentence starts with: 'As instructed by Bapak President 
Suharto .... ' . President Suharto uses many trusties like Har-
moko but Harmoko has qualities which other loyalists lack. 
He is able to translate Suharto's wishes and commands into 
easily digestible forms; it is as if Harmoko can penetrate the 
president's mind, making life much easier for Suharto. He 
simply leaves it to Harmoko to · do all the official explaining 
to the outside world. 
His job as chair of GO LKAR takes Harmoko to the remote 
comers of the republic. His frequent trips to the provinces, 
EROFILE 
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~da~amed the ~farmoko Safari, keeps him constantly in the 
hmehght. On his travels, he often gets a traditional welcome 
and with it. another front page picture of the minister dressed 
i!1 a some exotic costume. Everywhere he goes he delivers 
lively speeches containing the same hollow message. As they 
~y, empty vessels make the most sound. Indonesian political 
life has become unthinkable without the dashing Harmoko. 
But more critical minds detest his constant presence at the 
centre of state power. · Harmoko is one of the infamous '4 
ha's' (or ha ha ha ha) for Harto, Habibie, Harmoko and Bob 
Hasan, the four most notorious characters in the Republic of 
Indonesia. 
A new wave of strikes 
!he Ramadan mon~h off asting is supposed to be a month of self-reflection, restraint and tranquil-
ity. On the Indonesian labour front the opposite is the case. The annual bonus given prior to /du/ 
Fitri, the end of the fast, is a major conflict between management and workers. ' 
T APOL receives numerous reports about labour conflicts, 
not only from newspaper clippings but also from Indonesian 
NGOs. This time we want to limit ourselves to a few cases in 
East Java, a region not often in the spotlight but a place with 
many labour disputes. 
Of the many strikes in East Java, three cases are summa-
rised, all situated in or around Surabaya. The companies are 
PT Multi Manao Indonesia (PT MMI}, PT Yusan Miky Se-
jahtera (PT YMS) and PT Salim Brothers Perkasa (PT SBP). 
All three are typical examples of the Asia-Pacific manufac-
turing industry: producing cheap goods for export in appall-
ing working conditions. Lack of trade union representation is 
a common feature, compelling the workers to organise them-
selves in an association called Perwakilan Buruh (Workers 
Representation). One of the main targets of the workers' ac-
tions is the Depnaker (Manpower Department) Office. In 
labour conflicts the Department participates in the negotia-
tions and in most cases functions as an extension of the man-
agement. Workers' grievances against officials of this De-
partment are well-founded. 
PT MM! produces wooden furniture for export to the 
USA, Japan, Taiwan and Korea. The initial workforce of 650 
people (1980) is now down to 300. PT YMS is a textile sweat 
shop working for the European and US market producing 
jackets and trousers. The workforce was about 150, 95 per 
cent of them women, but after the labour conflict it fell to 67. 
PT SEP is situated in Sidoardjo, some 50 kms from the capi-
tal Surabaya and produces sports shoes for export (Japan and 
US) and the domestic market. The company has a workforce 
of about 900 people (90 per cent women). 
110 workers suspended 
PT Salim Brothers Perkasa (PT SBP) has two factories in 
Sidoardjo. The management is fond of imposing a kind of 
military discipline for the workers and forcing them to wear 
uniforms which they have to pay for themselves. The initial 
conflict was about working conditions usually called hak 
normatif (normative rights) . These normative rights are sup-
posed to be automatically met by the management but there 
have been many labour conflicts because of the manage-
ment's stubborn refusal to acknowledge these rights. In the 
PT SBP case the conflict was about the monthly menstruation 
leave, health insurance and minimum wages. The first ac-
tions started in November last year and continued with a 
strike from 9 - 14 January 1995. During this strike the man-
agement requested the assistance of the police. While hun-
dreds of women workers were standing in front of the factory 
gates in the pouring rain, the security forces stepped in and 
used brute force. Several women were hurt, and three fainted 
during the incident. 
On 16 January PT SBP announced that the factory would 
be shut and closed the gates. The announcement was made by 
Police Lieutenant Satirin to the hundreds of workers waiting 
at the gate. In the next few days, police officers visited the 
workers' compounds and told them to go home to their vil-
lages as the factory has been closed indefinitely. A week later 
the PT SBP management declared the factory open again but · 
d~manded a re-selection on its workforce. Those. -willing to -
s1gn a statement declaring the strike illegal were allowed . 
back. Many workers were forced by the police to sign the 
statement. More than hundred workers refused to sign. C> 
Time to Increase Wages 
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On 23 January the entire workforce marched to the local 
Manpower Department office. Military and police offic~rs 
interfered and some workers' spokespersons were heavily 
intimidated. On 27 - 30 January 1995 about 160 PT SBP 
workers took firmer action, occupying the front lawn of the 
office. The workers were ignored by the local authorities. At 
first, the security officers left them in peace but on 30 Janu-
ary the workers received a final warning to leave the prem-
ises, which they did. 
On 3 I January the PT SBP management announced the 
suspension of 11 l workers for 6 months. The 11 l workers 
were seen as the core group of workers continually involved 
in the protesting. Some 160 workers continue their actions in 
front of the Manpower Office. 
On 6 February a one-day demonstration of about 100 
workers took place in front of the gate. In the evening , after 
leaving the factory, two women workers were abducted by 
four men in a jeep. They were taken to the local police head-
quarters to be interrogated by Police Lt. Satiri!l· 
Thirty colleagues waited outside the police office till 
aft.er midnight. The two were conditionally released 
and told to report every week to the police authori-
ties. Heavy pressure was imposed on them to stop 
their actions. One of the two women, A Maria (29 
years), is seen as a leader of the workers. The conflict 
is far from over, having gone from bad to worse. At 
the moment of writing the PT SBP management is 
trying to dismiss 160 workers. The workers have 
kept their spirits high and continue to demand their 
rights. 
Camping in front of the Depnaker 
Office 
Hundreds of workers have set up camp in front of 
the Depnaker office to protest the conditions in their 
ers of both companies were fundamentally the same_ for both 
groups. After striking, workers from both compam~s were 
sacked . Since November workers of the two compames have 
received no wages . 
Workers of PT YMS have been in conflict with the man-
agement since June 1994 wh~~ they laur_1ched a two day 
strike on woeful working cond1l1ons. In this_ confhc~ dozens 
of workers were given the sack. The confhct contmued to 
escalate and from July till December 1994 the PT YMS work-
ers made numerous appeals to Depnaker, the local assembly 
and by writing letters to authorities in Jakarta. 
During the combined action _on 28 December, '_Vorkers 
were physically attacked by secunty officer~ and ~or~tbly re-
moved from the Depnaker building. Clubbmg, k1ckmg and 
hitting with bare fists were used against women workers. 
Four women, Padmi, Khotijah, Fat~mah an~ Saroh, h~d to be 
treated in hospital. The molestation contmu_ed outside ~he 
Depnaker premises. Surabaya bystanders _witnessed pohce 
brutalities against the workers. Reports registered the_ n~mes 
of the police officers responsible. The results we~e mm1mal: 
the Depnaker officials promised to find a solution for the 
conflict. 
factories. Workers from two companies PT Multi A security officer closing the factory gates to striking workers, a 
Manao Indonesia (PT MM!) and PT Yusan Miky Se- typical scene duri11g labour disputes i11 l11tlo11esia.. 
jahtera (PT YMS) joined ranks and camped outside Between 3 _ 5 January about 50 PT YMS workers decided 
for one week between 23 February - 1 March 1995. One day to step up their action and set up a camp in front of the Dep-
before the ending of Ramadan the authorities decided to pay naker Office, to step up the pressure because the Depnaker 
the THR (Iunjangan Hari Raya, annual bonus) as much as Office hadn't come up with any solution. On the third day the 
Rp.50,000 for each person. The bonus was actually due from peaceful camp ended in police brutality. A combined police 
the company but the Department decided to concede to t~e force of more than 100 men ordered the workers to 'pack' 
demand by p_aying the bonus itself. The other demands sttll their things and dismantle the tent. The only victory the 
remain unanswered. workers got was the payment of their annual bonus and one 
The conflict at PT MM! started last year. Between 17 - 23 month's wages. 
November some 300 MM! workers went on strike in support On 18 January a historic demonstration took place when 
of nineteen demands. The management responded by closing workers from the three companies, PT MM!, PT YMS and PT 
the gates and declaring the workers redundant. The workers SBP held a combined action in front of the Depnaker Office. 
continued their actions and in the following weeks actions More than 1,000 workers joined the demonstration. They 
were held in front of the local assembly and the Depnaker expected members from the National Human Rights Coi_n-
Office. Deputations were sent to the National Commission of mission to be present, but nobody appeared. Without the ex1s-
Human Rights and the Chief of the National Police in Ja- tence of a trade union the workers of the three companies 
karta. managed to join ranks through a self-organised Perwakilan 
Between 13 - 15 December more than 200 workers of PT Buruh in each of the companies. The relentless determination 
MM! occupied the Depnaker Office. The Depnaker officials of the .workers showed again in the one-week occupation of 
called in the security and one truck of anti-riot police was the Depnaker fron( lawn. The frequent actions received a lot 
sent in. Under the watchful eye of the security officers the of support from the Surabaya population. Although no con-
workers had to negotiate with company lawyers, but no re- crete results has been achieved by the actions, the workers of 
suits were achieved. Two weeks later, on 28 and 29 Deccm- Surabaya have gained a lot of experience. Several workers' 
ber a new action was launched and another occupation took leaders have been born in the actions and the support from pla~e at the Depnaker Office, this time a combined action by the population has been impressive. Some workers might 
workers of PT AfMI and PT YMS. The same set of demands have lost their jobs in the actions but all the workers have 
on normative rights and for direct negotiations with the own- gained pride and dignity. * 
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the June closures, have taken the lead in actions in support of 
press freedom. 
The PIJAR raid 
The search warrant for the PIJAR office quoted Article 
154 (insulting the government) of the Criminal Code. It is 
clear from the interrogation of Tri Agus that he was arrested 
in connection with the organisation's publication, of which 
he is chief editor. The Article 154 charge carries a maximum 
sentence of seven years. 
Since the press clampdown in June 1994, publications like 
K.DP, Jndependen and Kompak, a journal published by jour-
nalists in Bandung, have filled a gap for those thirsting for 
uncensored news. These samizdat publications are sold 
openly on the streets and are eagerly sought after. 
In a press statement, PIJAR protested against the arrest 
of their colleague and stressed that the fundamental issue is 
press freedom. It also pointed out that at the time of raid 
President Suharto was attending the UN conference in Co-
penhagen on Social Development; the raid would only further 
blacken Jakarta's reputation as a human rights violator. 
During the raid which took place late at night, valuable 
documents, diskettes and computers were confiscated. 
After raiding PIJAR, the security forces decided on the 
spot to raid the nearby office of another organisation, AL-
DERA (A/iansi Demokrasi Rakyat, Alliance of People's De-
mocracy). There were no arrests but the police confiscated 
more valuable documents. On 8 March another PIJAR mem-
ber, Syahrul, was arrested but released a day later. In the next 
few days, another nine people were summoned by the police 
as 'witnesses'. They include Eros Djarot, former editor of the 
banned political weekly DeTIK. Sunarty, acting chair of the 
free trade union SBSI (the chair, Muchtar Pakpahan, is serv-
ing a four-year sentence), Standarkiaa, secretary-general of 
ALDERA, Santoso, chair of AJI and two prominent PIJAR 
activists, Hakim Hatta and Rachland Nashidik. By then it had 
become clear that some of these witnesses could end up in the 
dock as well. 
Five AJI activists arrested 
The attack on AJI was not long in coming. On 17 March, 
the police raided and occupied the premises of AJI. Earlier 
the same evening, police agents forced their way into a social 
gathering organised by AJJ to mark the end of Ramadan. 
During a tussle between police and guests who were trying to 
CENSORSHIP 
prevent AJI members from being ~eized, five peopl~ ~ere 
arrested: Ahmad Taufik, Liston P.Suegar, Danang, F1tn, all 
AJJ members and Sri Bintang Pamungkas, an outspoken 
member of Parliament. The police told the organisers that 
they were looking for Santoso, chair of the organisation, who 
was not present. This social gathering at a hotel in central 
Jakarta was attended by well-known critics of the govern-
ment, along with diplomats from a number of embassies as 
well as several foreign journalists. 
After spending three hours in a police cell, the five were 
all released, except for Danang. Early the following morning, 
Ahmad Taufik was dragged from his bed and three others, 
Eko Maryadi, J. Sahfr and Abdul Haris were also ~en ~nto 
custody. Colonel Nurfauzi from the Jakarta Pohce Cnme 
Investigation Squad, said that AJI' s unlicensed publication, 
Jndependen, was being subjected to close scrutinr They will 
find plenty of interest to study. The lead story m ~he latest 
issue, No 12/1995 which was on sale at the AJI social event, 
is entitled: The President sick? Feuding within the political 
elite. 
Another publieation subjected to intimidation is Media 
Mitra, the journal of the women's organisation, Kalyanami-
tra. 
... . · . ... 
;PWl~xpulsions tbreate1l jolJs . · 
..• . . . . . . . ,. i 
. As :part of the overali attack on journalists .who have., 
. boldly asserted their inde~ndeoce ofgovemrilent interfet~ : 
ence the Jakarta branch of the PWI announce(l on 18 Marc~ 
the ~xp9Isi0n of thirteen jo0malists. The reasoil ·given fof the 
~xpuijions was that they had all .signed the Sirp(lgali/:I Dec/a~ 
ration >.which led to the establisllmeot of AJI last August J:he I 
branch chair also called ori: :hlladifors to stop employing AJI 
jou~lists. !Jecau~ . of the insHtlitional role of . this yellow 
joum.hli$~' assOciation, th~se journalists are now effectiyely. 
tiann69 fr.om. the profession. · 
· Thethlrt~h ;u.e· G0e~wan Mohaffimad, Film Jufri {both 
JorineF&iitors oftempo), ijappy·Sulistiadi, Ardian T. Gesuri, 
: oiah: PUrilorriowati~ Budimari s. Hartoyo, Toriq Hadad, Yopie 
)Jida~Larid Moebarioe Moera· (all Tempo journalists), Eros 
bjarof(Vic~-editqr ·of DeTIK), Hasudungan Sirait (Bisnis 1n-
.lfqnesi0); :Safrfo Arismunandar ( Kompas) and Yosep Adi 
Piaseifo<(Jaktirra4akarta). · .. .· 
: ; The expltlsion~ are likety to be followed by expulsions in 
other brandies: altogether about fifty journalists were signa-
focle$ 0.ftlie bectaration. The future for press freedom in In-
done5ia beeom:es grimmer with every passing day. 
·There is no place in Suharto's corporatist system for more 
than one journalists' organisation. From the outset, those who 
boldly moved to challenge the regime on this crucial issue of 
freedom of association, knew that this would be a risky ven-
ture, putting their livelihoods on the line. Like the independ-
ent trade unions that have emerged · in the past few years, the 
I 
persistent meddling by the authoritfo~ ~lls for co~ge, ~e­
termination and a long-tenn apprec1at1on of the issues m-
volved. 
Many AJI members are young journalists who started 
their careers in the student press, until recently one of the few 
free places for freedom of speech. Today, many campus press 
organs are also feeling the heat of security forces control. 
continued on page 24 
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ARMS SALES 
UK's deadly arms trade with Indonesia 
On 2 March Michael Heseltine, President of the Board of Trade, announced the issue of a licence 
to Alvis in Coventry to export armoured vehicles to Indonesia. In February the Foreign Office as-
sured Jose-Ramos Horta of CNRM that Britain did not recognise Indonesia's annexation of East 
Timor. This can only mean that the UK government recognises that Indonesian troops are illegally 
stationed in East Timor. The new export licences for more arms sales to Indonesia means the Brit-
ish government is contravening its own policy of non-recognition. 
According to the Stockholm International Peace Research 
Institute (SIPRI) Britain was the second major supplier of 
arms to Indonesia in the years 1987/91, with only the US 
selling more. However huge deals secured since then are 
thought to have made Britain Indonesia's top arms supplier. 
In October 1994, Field Marshal Peter Inge, the UK Chief 
of Defence Staff visited General Feisal Tanjung, the Indo-
nesian Armed Forces Chief. Tanjung then told reporters that 
the Indonesia government would purchase Alvis Scorpion 
armoured fighting vehicles. The manufacturers, Alvis of 
Coventry, describe the Scorpion as been suitable to a range of 
duties including internal security and use in rugged terrain. 
Janes Defence Weekly at the time reported that Indonesia 
was to purchase between 120 and 140 newly built vehicles 
including Scorpion-90 and Stormer Armoured Personel 
Carriers (APCs) . A further 16 British Aerospace Hawks 
ground attack fighter/trainers were also ordered. This Hawks 
order followed an order 
for 24 Hawks an-
nounced in 1993, worth 
about £500 million. 
Alvis has been in pro-
tracted negotiations to 
sell 600 FV-101 Scor-
pion light tanks to In-
donesia since the 198.0s. 
..... - ..... 1 .. 
••<>- '"' au111 
Saracen and Ferret vehicles in service with a South-East 
Asian country. 
T APOL Bulletin of May 1984 reproduced three pictures 
of three different types of Alvis tanks being paraded in the 
streets of Jakarta. The photographs included one of a student 
being arrested and dragged onto the back of an Alvis made 
Ferret-Scout armoured car in Jakarta. 
On 2 Febr. protesters gathered at the Alvis factory which 
is on the outskirts of Coventry. The site will become a fre-
quent site for demonstrators in the coming months. later that 
day a public meeting was held in Coventry, hosted by the 
Coventry Trades Union Council. Jose Ramos Horta, the spe-
cial representative of the CNRM, the Timores resistance, was 
the main speaker and spoke strongly against the delivery of 
the Alvis tanks to Jakarta. The meeting was also addressed by 
Carmel Budiardjo of T APOL and Will McMahon from Cam-
paign Against Arms Trade (CAA T). T APOL along with sup-
1 l porters of Campaign 
11 Against Arms Trade i (CAA T) and the British 
I Coalition for East Timor 
(BCET) protested against 
the sale of the Alvis vehi-
cles at the Alvis AGM in 
central London on March 
7th. 
Answering a question 
from a representative of 
T APOL, an Alvis director 
tried to justify the deal by 
claiming that it was origi-
nally intended to supply 
tanks for Indonesian troops 
that might go to Bosnia for 
peace-keeping purposes. 
The recently formed 'Stop 
Field Marshall Peter 
lnge, insisting that he 
would not comment on 
political issues, told 
reporters that Britain 
would strengthen de-
fence ties with Indone-
sia and that co-
operation would not be 
upset by international 
criticism of Indonesia's 
handling of affairs in 
East Timor. 
Picket-line at the emra11ce to Alvis. Close to the Alvis sign is Jose the Hawks - No Arms to 
Ramos Horta, CNRM representative. Indonesia ' coalition will 
Alvis has a history of involvement in arms trade with In-
donesia since the late 1960s. The Military Balance of 1993-
1994 listed the following Alvis vehicles as being in' the pos-
session of the Indonesian armed.forces : 
• 60 Saladin armoured reconnaissance vehicles 
• 45 Ferret armoured vehicles 
• 45 Saracen armoured personnel carriers 
Janes Defence Contracts of June 1994 listed a $10 million 
contract awarded to an Alvis Vehicles UK subsidiary - He-
lio Mirror Company - to supply upgrade kits for Saladin, 
continue to intensify its campaigning, challenging the UK 
government and pressing for accountability at the Annual 
General Meetings of British Aerospace, Alvis and the banks 
reported to be providing the financial backing for the Alvis 
deal. Other actions include speaking tours, articles and vigils. 
FoHowing the recent statement made by Indonesia's Na-
tional Commission on Human Rights condemning the Janu-
ary killings of six East Timorese civilians by Indonesian 
troops, T APOL feels that licensing the export of the Alvis 
tanks and further Hawks is nothing less than condonation of 
such bestial behaviour. * 
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The story of the Burn forced labour camp 
On 16 August 1969, 1,500 political prisoners, "tapols", were herded onto a ship at Nusa Kembangan 
prison island in Central Java which set sail for the notorious Buru island forced labour camp. 
Among the tapols was Indonesia's best known writer and novelist, Pramoedya Anania Toer, one of 
the first to arrive and one of the last to leave. The publication of his memoirs is a major literary 
event. 
Pramoedya .never beats about the bush when speaking 
about what has happened and is still happening to him. Im-
prisonment under the Orde Baru, the New Order, did not last 
only for the 14 years from the day of his arrest on 13 October 
1965 till his return home from Burn in November 1979. It 
continues to this very day with infringements of his civil 
rights as a 'ex-tapol'. He still has the initials ET branded on 
his identity card. 
~----
- -- - ·--·-
Buru isumd, 111a11y years of hard physical labour for le/IS of thou-
saml'> of untried political prirn11ers. f Photo: Peter Sclmmaclier/ 
The decision to banish, without trial, tens of thousands of 
political prisoners who had been taken into custody after Su-
harto's seizure of pmver in October 1965 was a tightly-
guarded secret. Women with whom I spent years in detention 
were never informed that their husbands had been transported 
more than a thousand miles away. This ranks as one of the 
most inhuman crimes against defenceless men and women 
committed by Suharto's Orde Baru. 
Pramoedya 's Nyanyian Sunyi Seorang Bisu. or Silent 
Song of a Dumb Man, was published in Indonesia earlier this 
year, seven years after it made its first-appearance in print in 
Malaysia. It remains to be seen whether the authorities will 
allow it to circulate freely or ban it, which has been the fate to 
date of all of Pramoedya' s books, whatever the subject. 
Nyanyian Sunyi Seorang Bisu is a detailed and harrowing 
record of conditions in the forced labour camp th11t became 
the focus of world attention during the 1970s, when Indone-
sia ranked as the country with by far the largest number of 
untried political prisoners. Pramoedya was its most famous 
inmate, whose presence on hell's island bequne a constant 
source of embarrassment to the regime. He was always 
among the group of prisoners brought to camp headquarters, 
Mako, to meet visiting journalists or government offidals. 
Many of his conversations are recorded- in detail. Inevitably 
the many foreign journalists he met were the ones who inter-
viewed him with sympathy. But he says that when he met 
some of the Indonesian journalists who came, being inter-
viewed by them was like being questioned by army interroga-
tors. 
Given the privilege to write 
Because of the international interest in Pramoedya ' s fate. 
the authorities were forced to -make concessions , allowing 
him the privilege of writing yet not giving him the where-
withal to enjoy the privilege. It was only by dint of support 
from his fellow-victims, who- r'epairecf K broken-down type-
writer for him and provided him with his daily needs to free 
him from the back-breaking physieal labour required from all 
the men, old or young, healthy or sick, that he was able to 
return to his profession as writer. The nine essays included in 
this book were all written thanks to this solidarity. 
When the tide turned in the mid- l 970s and the regime 
was compelled by world opinion io release all the untried 
tapols, Pramoedya, their celebrity prisoner, -was listed among 
those to be sent back in the first group from Buru in l 977. It 
would have been · quite a media event. But Pram had said 
something regarded as offensive b~' one of the officers in 
charge and his name was removed from the list. This misde-
meanour added another two years to his detention in Buru. 
'Starting a new life' 
The first essay is a letter to his daughter "which I will 
never be able to send". As he mis setting sail for Buru, she 
was about to get married. "starting a new life" as the greeting 
for newly-weds puts it in Indonesian. The prisoners too were 
told that they were 'starting out on a new life' . a life of 
'useful labour' for the good of the state. Pramoedya reflects 
at some length on the fact that as they sailed in abominable 
conditions to their new life. Indonesia was celebrating the 
24th anniversary of the country's independence on l 7 August 
1945. As those familiar with Pramoedya ·s works will know. 
he has written a number of no,·cls against the background oft> 
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the Indonesian people ' s struggle for independence in the 
late I 9-Hls 
Befo re he began to write again in Buru he spent several 
years alongside fellow-pri soners engaged in the unbelievably 
strenuous labour of opening up inhospitable savannah, often 
having to cut down the sharp-edged and tough stalks of im-
perata or alang-alang. as it is called in Indonesian, with their 
bare hands. He describes how many of the men who were 
banished to Buru had spent years of hardship and mal-
nourishment verging on starvation at prisons and detention 
camps and were not in a fit state to do any kind of work, let 
alone the tasks required of them, transforming vast swathes 
of Buru island from a wilderness into a very productive agri-
cultural project, exporting rice to other parts of the Moluccan 
archipelago. 
One essay entitled From and to My Children is autobio-
graphical, his reply to a letter he received from his children 
in 1972. It ranges over many topics, from his courtship with 
their mother to his attitude towards injustice to other artists 
during the Sukarno presidency. Pramoedya has been ground-
lessly accused of being responsible for the clampdown on 
writers and artists before 1965. He records his discussions 
with the many other artists in Bum on attitudes towards in-
justice 
Roll-call of death 
Pramoedya dedicated himself in particular to the task of re-
cording the fate of the many men who died on Bum.. The 
essay entitled ' ... and those who departed' looks at the cir-
cumstances in which a number of Bum tapols died. One was 
a young man named Kayun, still a teenager when he was 
arrested in 1965, who took it upon himself to work fero 
ciously hard to alleviate the burden on elderly men incapable 
of harsh physical labour. Being malnourished himself, he 
collapsed one day and was taken to the unit clinic, where he 
lay burdened by a sense of guilt because others were no_w 
having to care for him. One day the unit commander, Captam 
Sudjono Hadisiswoyo, came to the clinic, announced a roll-
call and forced everyone to leave their sick-beds to attend. As 
Kayun stood trembling with fever, the captain struck ~m on 
the head with his baton. A few hours later, the older pnsoners 
found his body lying in a ditch, foam coming from his mouth 
and a bottle of endrine by his side. 
In order to keep a record of all the deaths at the Buru pe-
nal camp, Pramoedya asked fellow-tapols in every unit for 
the names of all the people who died each year. The records 
were meticulously kept from year to year until 1978 when the 
prison authorities got wind of what was going on and warned 
people to stop. The list of names is published as an appendix. 
The tapols also decided to mark the graves of those who 
died, engraving the name of each person on a slab of stone, in 
the hope that one day relatives would be able to come and 
retrieve their bodies. 
Pramoedya's Nyanyian Sunyi is a moving tribute to the 
hundreds of thousands who suffered and perished in the dun~ 
geons, secret detention camps, prisons and forced labour 
camps that accompanied Suharto's rise to power. It will go 
down in history as a literary work of great political signifi-
cance, and its appearance in English will help confirm the 
author's position as a writer of world stature 
Carmel Budiardjo 
Flogging the official version 
Late last year, the Suharto regime came out with a 'White Book' purporting to reveal the truth 
about what really happened in October 1965 when General Suharto seized power. The State Secre-
tariat was given the onerous duty of putting its imprimatur to this shoddy distortion of history. 
Any regime that comes to power in such a wave of vio-
lence and death as that which engulfed Indonesia in the 
months following I October 1965 will be anxious for the 
tmth about who was behind those bloody events to be oblit-
erated. Although numerous articles and essays have been 
written abroad analysing the events of October 1965, notably 
at Cornell University and by Professor W.F. Wertheim in 
Holland, the subject has been strictly taboo in Indonesia . 
Within hours of Suharto taking control of the Indonesian 
armed forces and instigating his bloody purge of the left-wing 
movement, he began to assert that the Indonesian Communist 
Pa rty had masterminded the event. 
Aware of the danger of allowing the study and interpreta-
tion of the event to fall into the hands of unauthorised per-
sons. the White Book states at the outset that: 
the scientific study of the threat of Commu-
nism!Afarxism/leninism in order to protect the Pancasila 
must be properly guided and kept in the hands of the Gov-
ernment. 
Alternative versions outlawed 
Over the years, some brave souls in Indonesia have at-
tempted .publicly to launch an alternative theory about what 
really happened. One such was a la'"yer named Sunardi who 
had defended Sawito, a man with pretensions to become the 
president of Indonesia. Sunardi soon discovered that thinking 
and writing about the unthinkable would land him in jail. 
Some years earlier, in 1977, one of the officers who organised 
the kidnappings and murders of seven generals (one of whom 
escaped) on I October 1965, Colonel Latief, made more than 
a hint at the role of Suharto in those events. It was he per-
sonally, he told a court, who informed Suharto that the gen-
erals were to be kidnapped in a few hours time. This was 
stated during his trial but his document never saw the light of 
day in Indonesia. 
Early last year, it was the turn of another brave soul to try 
to lift the veil of secrecy that has stifled all discussion of such 
a forbidden subject. The man in question was Wimandjaja K. 
Liotohe, a prolific writer who decided to file a lawsuit accus-
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sing General Suharto of being behind the move in 1965 to 
overthrow President Sukarno. When a copy of the lawsuit 
bearing the title Primadosa or Prime Sin , landed on Suharto' s 
desk, having already been in circulation for several weeks, 
the dictator made no secret of his anger. He fumed against the 
document at a meeting with officers at his Tapos ranch in 
February last year. 
Within days, the 'book' had been banned (in fact it wasn ' t 
a book but a collection of documents for submission to the 
courts) and the defiant Wimandjaja was hauled in for inter-
rogation. There was talk of his being charged under Article 
134 of the Criminal Code for insulting the President. He was 
reportedly under arrest. In the event, nothing happened and 
he has since left Jakarta for his native Sangir Talaud. Could 
it be that there are people in the security forces these days 
who are no longer very enthusiastic about putting away peo-
ple who have a contentious story to tell about 1965? 
Whatever the truth about what happened to Wimandjaja, 
it is certain that the episode made it imperative for Suharto to 
pr9C1uce something that would be accepted as the official ver-
sion, immutable and for posterity. 
History as told by the victor 
The title of the White Book is The 30 September Move-
ment, the Rebellion of the Indonesian Communist Party. The 
first 125 pages set out to expose the PKI as a party of strug-
gle, constantly engaged in rebellion, subterfuge and discord. 
Not a single 'fact' is sourced. We are grateful to Professor 
Wertheim for exposing a crude fabrication about the PKI on 
page 37. The reader is told that a meeting of the Central 
Committee in 1954 adopted The Combination of Three 
Forms of Struggle: 
a. Guerrilla struggle in the countryside consisting of peas-
ant workers and poor peasants, 
b. The revolutionary struggle of workers in the towns, es-
pecially the transport workers, 
c. Intensive work within the ranks of the enemy, espe-
cially within the armed forces. 
In fact, this was the party's programme during the strug-
gle against the Dutch from 1945 to 1949; the army described 
as the enemy was the Dutch, not the Indonesian. In 1954, the 
party adopted the parliamentary struggle as its programme. 
Whatever the intentions of the regime, much of what it 
says about the PKI may make the reader feel that the party 
had something inspiring to offer the Indonesian people, as 
compared with the stagnant and putrid atmosphere that 
passes for politics in Suharto's Orde Baru. Indeed, the re-
gime's film covering the same ground as the White Book 
which truckloads of school-children have been required to 
watch, has ended up making some people want to know more 
about the PKI! Could this explain why the book has not been 
easily available in the bookshops? Even members of Parlia-
ment were complaining some weeks after publication that 
they had not been able to find copies anywhere. 
The remainder of the book gives the Suharto version of 
the events of 1 October 1965, based of course on army docu-
ments and pronouncements. 
A sceptical audience 
The reports we have seen from the Indonesian press do 
not suggest that the book has been received with enthusiasm. 
On the contrary, some commentators argue forcefully that the 
only way to get an objective view of what happened is to 
The ruthless General Suharto wearing battle dress in October 
1965. 
leave the job to historians. Dr Ruslan Abdul Gani, a senior 
politician during the days of Sukarno, told students that he 
was deeply concerned about how Indonesian history is being 
recorded. 
When you read history, look first at who is the writer be-
cause history is always written in the . interests of those in 
power. [Waspada, 18.X.1994] 
Moerdiono, the State Secretary whose task it has been to 
defend the book, assured journalists that it was very scientific 
because it was based entirely on the verbatim records of the 
trials staged by the special military courts in the 1960s. These 
were of course kangaroo trials held precisely in order to es-
tablish Suharto's version of what happened. Why, Moerdiono 
was asked, had the authors not interviewed individuals who 
were directly involved in the events, an accepted method for 
writing up contemporary history? This would only have pro-
vided subjective interpretations, said Moerdiono. He might 
have added that many of the witnesses were dead anyway, 
murdered in the six-month orgy of slaughter that followed 
Suharto ' s seizure of power. But that side of the story is not 
even mentioned in the official version. * 
Books to read on 1965 
M.R Siregar: Tragedi A1anusia dan Kemanusiaan. Kasus 
Indonesia Sebuah Holokaus vang Diterima Sesudah Perane. 
• L 
Dunia Kedua. A 566-page, detailed account and analys is, 
thoroughly annotated. The first edition came out in a very 
limited number only. The second edition is due out shortly, 
with an Introduction by Professor W.F. Wertheim 
We plan to review this important book in our next issue. 
Robert Cribb, ed: The Indonesian J.:il/1ngs 1965 - 1966: 
Studies from Java and Bali. Monash Papers on Southeast 
Asia, No 21 published by Monash University in 1990. 
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More killings in the Freeport drama 
Persistent reports from West Papua (lrian Jaya) for the period November 1994 to February 1995 
indicate that there have been military operations in the vicinity of Freeport, the huge gold and cop-
per-mine. According to the reports, Papuan villagers have been killed, intimidated and tortured. 
One handwritten message refers to an incident on 9 No-
vember 1994 where OPM (Organisasi Papua Merdeka) ac-
tions alleged to have taken place in Tembagapura, the city 
built by the mining company, resulted in an expatriate em-
ployee of PT Freeport Indonesia being shot. A day earlier, 
an employee from Biak was shot dead by unidentified people. 
Indonesian military immediately retaliated by sending mili-
tary aircraft loaded with troops to the area. As a result, the 
population of the village of Tsinga fled in fear of military 
actions. Another report says that the troops searched the for-
ests and the lowlands. 
Late in November it was reported that the military had 
shot people in Tsinga in the highlands. A few months earlier 
the same village was the scene of a flag-raising ceremony [see 
Tapol Bulletin No. 126, December 1994] after which the In-
donesian army came down hard on the villagers. None of the 
reports give hard facts about the number of casualties. Ac-
cording to one, there were 12 casualties among the people 
from the Tsinga valley; whether these were all deaths or in-
cluded some wounded people is not clear. 
Another flag-raising ceremony 
The handwritten report refers to another flag-raising 
ceremony, this time on Christmas Day. Approximately 60 
people gathered to raise the Morning Star (West Papua) flag 
near Tembagapura. The military responded to this act of defi-
ance by killing one demonstrator. Others were arrested and 
interrogated. As punishment, they were locked up in metal 
containers for up to 5 days. The report also says that other 
people were shot. 
It is likely that the metal containers belong to the mining 
company. In 1977, during an OPM operation against the 
company, there were reports of people being held in metal 
containers. This form of punishment has not been used any-
where else. 
Flag-raising has long been the tradition of Papuan resis-
tance against the Indonesians. Although largely a symbolic 
gesture, it reflects popular support for the aspirations for in-
dependence still deep-rooted among Papuans. Reports about 
human rights violations in densely populated areas like Java 
are more easily picked up by the press, but in remote West 
Papua brutalities by the Indonesian military often go unre-
ported. The infrequent reports received by TAPOL and other 
human rights organisations about conditions in West Papua 
are often from protected sources or people who do not want to 
identify themselves. Under such circumstances, cross-
checking the information is difficult. Reporting about abuses 
in West Papua in the Indonesian press is practically non-
existent, just as reporting about East Timor used to be, a dec-
ade ago. 
Freeport's golden goose 
PT Freeport Indonesia Company is often seen as the flag-
ship of success for foreign investments in Indonesia. The 
New Orleans-based company, Freeport McMoRan, entered 
Indonesia in early 1966 in the very first months of the Orde 
Baru regime. Tanks were still rolling in the streets of Jakarta 
chasing alleged communists when Freeport managed to score 
a scoop with the very first foreign investment contract with 
the new Indonesian government: This project, exploiting a 
10,000 ha copper mine, became one of the most lucrative 
enterprises in the mining industry. It soon became apparent 
that gold ore was also very substantial; in fact the Freeport 
mine has become the world's largest gold-mine and the sec-
ond biggest open-pit copper mine. 
The Freeport mining operation consists of 2 blocks. The 
Ertsberg mine (10,000 ha), block A, has been exploited since 
1969, but is still a productive open mine . Previously a black 
shiny mountain, Ertsberg has become a deep water-filled 
crater. The new operation, block B, also called Grasberg, 
about 2 kms away, is a vast area of 2.6 million ha. Block B 
will be exploited in a few years time. The new operation will 
increase output to 900 million pounds of copper and 1.1 mil-
lion ounces of gold by contrast with 770 million pounds of 
copper and 800,000 ounces of gold in 1994. Conservative 
figures made public last year estimated Freeport copper re-
serves to be worth US$ 23 billion and its gold reserves to be 
worth a total of US$ 15 billion. 
Huge exp~nsion 
The Grasberg operation has turned the project into the 
world's biggest single mining operation. The initial joint 
venture PT Freeport Indonesia consisted of three partners: 
Freeport McMoran Copper & Gold owns 80 per cent the 
Indonesian G~vernment IO per cent and PT Jndocoppe~ ln-
vestama, a pnvate company, 10 per cent. The Grasberg ex-
pansion will transform the entire region. The high-altitude 
boom town Tembagapura, inhabited by Freeport personnel is 
connected by a 75 km road to the coastal town Timika. Tem-
bagapura is inhabited by 14,500 residents including many ex-
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patriates from the US, Canada, Australia, Great Britain and 
the Philippines. The facilities at Tembagapura are like any 
affluent middle-class suburb: air-conditioned compounds, 
excellent medical care, cable television, two shopping com-
plexes and subsidised clubs and bars. Two free schools are 
available plus tennis courts, a soccer field and basketball 
court. The Freeport management is so confident about the 
future that it has struck a deal with a real-estate company 
owned by Manpower Minister Abdul Latief to build an new 
city close to Timika. The US$500 million town is for the 
administrative and logistical personnel now living in over-
crowded Tembagapura. The new town will have abundant 
recreational activities: an 18-hole golf course, health clinics, 
swimming pools and a four star Sheraton Hotel. The growth-
philosophy of Freeport is quite simple: "We need elbow room 
to grow and provide a hub city for many more Tembagapuras 
along the mountain chain", says George Mealey, Freeport-
McMoran president. [FEER, 10 March 1994]. 
RTZ joins in 
The huge expansion created a cash flow problem for 
Freeport McMoRan (FM!) and this brought the UK mining 
company RTZ into the picture. On 8 March it was announced 
that RTZ, the world's biggest mining company, will acquire 
at least 21.5 million FM! shares, a 10.4 per cent stake in the 
company. This will cost RTZ an initial US$450 million but it 
is expected that more shares, up to US$875 million, will be 
purchased. RTZ will also plunge a 40 per cent working in-
terest in block A and B at a cost of US$100 million. In block 
ARTZ will also provide 100 per cent of certain current mine 
ex-pansion costs up to a limit of US$750 million. In total 
RTZ investments might total a whopping US$1,725 million, 
one of the biggest mining acquisitions in the nineties. 
RTZ is also active in another FM! operation in Spain but 
with an Indonesian tail. An investment of US$256 million 
has been made by RTZ to acquire 25 per cent interest in the 
Huelva copper smelter, Rio Tinto Minera (RTM) in Andalu-
sia and another 25 per cent interest in 1'MJ's Spanish explo-
ration program. Freeport Indonesia has provided the RTM 
smelter with 150,000 tons of copper concentrate in 1994 and 
this \viii gradually increase to about 50 per cent of RTM's 
requirements in 1996. 
A copper smelter will also be built in Gresik, in East Java, 
a joint venture of the Japanese giant Mitsubishi (70%) and 
two American companies Fluor Daniel Inc. (I 0%) and Free-
port McMoran (20%). The plant will have an annual capac-
ity of 200,000 tons of copper cathode, primarily for domestic 
consumption. The smelter will also produce 600,000 tons of 
sulphuric acid as a byproduct which will be supplied to the 
state-owned Petrokimia Gresik plant. It is to be expected that 
RTZ will be involved in the Gresik smelter in the near future. 
WEST PAPUA 
What·about the tribal people? 
The two mining companies are notoriously neglectful of 
the rights of the native people and the environment. The local 
tribes, known under the combined name Masyarakat Hukum 
Adat ( Adat Law Community) have lost all their traditional 
land. The tribes have lost almost 1 million ha to transmigra-
tion and 7,000 ha to Timika and now 25,000 ha to the new 
hub city at present known only as Kota Barn. The land ex-
propriation occurred between 1983 and 1985 and many tribal 
people did not realise what was going on. 
At a seminar last January held by the Environment Min-
istry and Freeport, the tribal people finally realised that they 
had lost all their ancestral land. The Amungme tribe who live 
round Timika have been particularly hard hit by the land-
grabbing. As they know from past experience, loud protests 
can have grave consequences: the military are brought in and 
they are accused of being OPM (Free Papua Movement) re-
bel gangs. The Amungme and other tribes only demand the 
use of their traditional land in the unused areas between the 
transmigration sites and the towns. The Komoro, Iwaka, 
Dani, Ikari, Moni and Duga tribes have made the same de-
mands for their traditional land along the newly built roads 
SP6 and SP7. 
The plight of the local people was raised in the national 
parliament in Jakarta, some 3,000 kms from Timika. Some 
MPs argued that the profits earned by Freeport were probably 
far greater than the benefits the local people have received 
from the company's presence. One MP, Mike Prionggo, who 
visited the site, said: " ... we got the impression that the com-
pany treats the area as part of the United States" [Jakarta 
Post, 21 June 1994]. But no-one was listening; in its 27 years 
of operation, Freeport has become an invaluable asset for 
Jakarta. 
Freeport is one of the biggest corporate tax payers in In-
donesia, contributing 47 per cent to Irian Jaya's gross do-
mestic product. Together with RTZ they gather a lot of politi-
cal clout and have close connections with Indonesian deci-
sion-makers. The interests of hunters and gatherers like the 
Amungme have had to make way for the insatiable hunger of 
two global mining companies. · * 
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Targetting AJI and PIJAR 
It is clear that Pi.Jar and A.JI have been selected as the tar-
gets in the current crackdown 
Several Indonesian publications have been used by the 
regime to float stories full of insinuations against PIJAR, 
portraying it as the instigator of all kinds of actions. Gatra, 
owned by limber tycoon Bob Hasan, the weekly that took over 
the licence of the banned Tempo. is playing a particularly 
despicable role in this respect. P!JAR is justifiably proud of 
its record of campaigning and support for actions on land 
conflicts, human rights issues and issues of a more general 
political nature. Several key members are still in jail, notably 
former chairperson Nuku Suleiman, serving a five-year sen-
tence and Beathor Suryadi, serving four and a half years. 
Beathor had been allowed out on parole but was rearrested 
last June for taking part in protests against the press bans. 
Both were sentenced for insulting the President. Another 
founder-member. Bonar Tigor Naipospos, was released last 
year after serving the best part of an 8-year sentence. His only 
crime was to have been a member of a discussion group that 
occasionally discussed left-wing theories. 
KDP, its publication, is being used as the pretext to hit 
hard at the organisation. Its June 1994 issue published a 
lively report of a public rally in Jakarta held on 23 June. The 
rally was one of a series of demonstrations against the ban-
ning of the three weeklies. Tempo, DeTIK and Editor. The 
report was factual, portraying the anti-government atmos-
phere of the demonstration. In the evening another gathering 
took place on the premises of the Legal Aid Institute, when 
the well-known human rights lawyer Adnan Buyung Nasu-
tion used strong words. He placed the blame for the chaotic 
situation squarely on Suharto. KDP headlined this quotation 
from Nasuti on' s speech. 
AJl's fight for press freedom 
The emergence of AJI in August 1994 was a direct result 
of the closure of Tempo, DeTIK and Editor. In several cities 
core groups of progressive journalists already existed but the 
clampdown accelerated the founding of AJJ. For years dissat-
isfaction with the PW!, the only recognised journalists' asso-
ciation, was mounting. The PW! is nothing more than an 
extension of the government and a tool of Information Minis-
ter Hannoko, one of Suharto's most loyal cronies. [See Pro-
file of Harmoko on page 13 .] The heavy blow against the 
press provoked a huge public outcry but the PW! said only 
that it ' understood ' the govenment's action. It was this 
statement that led finally to the creation of AJJ. 
AJI journal makes its mark 
It was a profoundly important move for the new organisa-
tion of journalists to start publishing its own journal. Jnde-
penden quickly became a journal of note, dealing with a va-
riety of political issues well beyond the scope of specific jour-
nalist interests. It has already published several well re-
searched articles on the business activities of some of Su-
harto 's closest allies. The Profile written in this issue about 
Information Minister Harmoko is largely based on articles 
published late last year by lndependen. Some articles have 
caught the attention of foreign journalists and were featured 
in reports by wire services such as Reuters. Without the need 
to keep looking over their shoulders at the censors, writers 
could speak their minds and produce the facts . In the stifling 
atmosphere of the Indonesian media today. there was an ca-
ger market for the publication which was on its wav to be-
coming a much sought-after journal where you co~ld read 
things about Indonesian politics not available anywhere else 
in Indonesia. 
Suharto becoming more vindictive 
There are many signs that the 73-year old president is 
losing his grip. He has alienated many former allies and has 
become distrustful of everyone, seeing plots lurking around 
every comer. He has always been vindictive but with age, this 
has got worse. As his position gets weaker, he becomes more 
vicious towards those he sees as potential enemies. The dis-
turbing events in 1994 should be seen in this light: Suharto 
striking hard at what he perceives as dangerous people, insti-
tutions or organisations. 
The vast Suharto family empire, now a multi-billion dol-
lar business, is a major worry, aggravated by criticism at 
home and abroad. Political analysts believe that Suharto has 
reached a point where he has decided that he cannot afford to 
step down in 1998. The only safeguard for the family for-
tunes is to hold on for yet another term. 
The current press clampdown is also an example of the 
growing role of the police in security and order. Ever since 
Suharto came to power, the police have played second fiddle 
continued on page 4 
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